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1. SUMMARY
Continued studies of a radioisotope-thermionic power supply for elec-
tric propulsion to the outer planets focused on the safety equipment to
protect against dispersal of the isotopic fuel. The safety equipment is
designed to be separated from the power supply and jettisoned early in the
heliocentric phase of the mission, as soon as Earth escape is verified.
Because of this, the mass of the safety equipment has little effect on the
mass of the payload delivered to the target planet. The objective of this
study was to improve the reliability of the safety equipment and increase
safety margins at the expense of some increase in mass.
A new reference design was perpared for the 5 kW(e) thermionic power
supply fueled with 44.2 kW{ t) of 244Cm203 • The safety equipment in this
design is a passive containment system which does not rely on the operation
of any mechanisms such as a launch escape rocket or deployment of parachutes.
It includes: (I) a blast shield to protect against the explosion of the
launch vehicle; (2) a combination of refractory thermal insulation and heat
storage material to protect against a sustained launch pad fire; (3) a
reentry body with a spherical nose and a large (2.44 m diameter) conical
flare at the aft end to stabilize the reentry attitude and lower the termi-
nal velocity in air; (4) composite graphite thermal protection to sustain
the reentry heat pulse; (5) crushable honeycomb behind the nose to limit (to
200 GIS) the deceleration of the radioisotope source due to impact on land
at terminal velocity; (6) a double-walled secondary containment vessel sur-
rounding the isotopic capsules; (7) neutron shielding to reduce external
dose rates; and (8) an auxiliary cooling system employing redundant heat
pipes to remove the radioactive decay heat from the heat source and reject
it to the surroundings or to a forced convection loop. Items 1, 2, 3, and 5
were added or modified during this phase of the study to replace the escape
rockets and parachutes considered in the previous phase. The mass of the
1
power supply is 724 kg at launch, 575 kg of which is jettisoned after the
Titan III-D/Centaur launch vehicle has boosted the power supply to an escape
trajectory.
The potential for achieving the 36,000-hour lifetime required for same
missions was also studied. The Cm203 capsules (at 2030" K surface tempera-
ture) and emitter heat pipes (at 190d'K) are expected to be the limiting
components. The effect of oxygen relEilased fram. the capsules by diffusion
through the walls and through the helium vent plug was. studied. It was
shawn that oxygen-induced sublimation of tungsten could remove as much as
0.2 mm fram the surface of the fUel capsules in 36,000 hours, but that the
loss rate would probably be much less. It was estimated that oxygen per-
meating the walls of the capsules and heat pipes could oxidize as much as
70 mg of lithium in each heat pipe. The calculations showed that there are
large uncertainties in estimating oxygen effects fram existing data, but
that there is considerable flexibility in the reference design to minimize
the effects of oxygen by use of gettering and other techniques.
This study showed the feasibility of protecting a 44.2 kW (1.3 x 106
Curie) source of 244Cm fram dispersal during launch accidents. Further
work is necessary to establish the technology for long-lived radioisotope
capBules and emitter heat pipes. Once the technology is established and
lifetime and performance limits are defined, it will be possible, with the
help of detailed development plans and cost estimates, to make a more well-
founded decision whether this system should be developed for some electric
propulsion missions to the outer planets or the deep space environment.
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2. INTROroCTION
A recent study (Ref. 1) examined in preliminary fashion the suitabiIity
of an isotope-thermionic power supply for electric propulsion to the outer
planets. The main feature was a separable entry safety container which was
discarded early in the sun-centered part of the night. The reference design
case was a 5 kW(e) system using a Curium-244 heat source. Because of the
preliminary nature of the study, various power levels and system configura-
tions were examined in limited detail.
As the first phase of this study came to a close, frequent mission
analyses were carried out using the latest values for estimated power and
propulsion system masses. These calculations indicated that in spite of the
weight growth during the first phase of the study, the system was still of
interest for propulsive application. Furthermore, some of the mission .parame-
ters, such as payload, were rather insensitive to some of the propulsion
system mass values such as the mass of the separable safety equipment. This
meant that continued work could take advantage of these insensitivities to
make the design generally more convincing from an engineering and safety
viewpoint. Also, a more detailed look at a specific design concept with
fewer alternatives could now be justified. As a result of changes in cost
and subsystem mass that evolved during the first phase of the contract, such
items as the nominal mission target and mission duration were changed for
this second phase.
In the continued study effort reported here, the goal was to consider
methods by which the separable safety equipment defined in the previous
study could be modified to improve the aerospace nuclear safety aspects of
the concept. Because these subsystems have law or negligible effect on the
mission payload, considerable mass increases could be tolerated. Also, a
more detailed examination was made of some of the lifetime and material
3
compatibility problems as well as unique orbital and superorbital abort
possibilities.
As a result of these studies, the reference design reported previously
(Ref. 1) was modified substantially. The principal modification was to
eliminate the launch escape rocket and parachute systems and replace them
with thermal insulation and heat storage materials, a blast shield, an
enlarged aerodynamic flare, and a thickened crushable hon~ycomb section in
the nose of the reentry body. The new design is described in Section 4. It
is based on the following mission and system constraints:
Radioisotope 244cm
Power 5 kW(e)
Mission Duration 36,000 hours
Launch Vehicle Titan III D-Centaur
The full power level of 5 kW(e) is required during the first 10,000
hours and the last 10,000 hours of the mission, with low power required
during the intervening 16,000 hours. The launch vehicle will inject the
radioisotope electric propulsion system directly into a heliocentric tra-
jectory with a hyperbolic speed on the order of 7.5 Jm/sec.
4
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3. SYMBOLS
rate of deceleration (m/sec2 )
a constant
projected area of the conical flare
projected or cross-sectional area of the nose
drag coefficient
drag coefficient for the flare
drag coefficient for the nose
a constant
reference enthalpy
local flow enthalpy
recovery enthalpy
wall enthalpy
radiant interchange factor
design deceleration limit in g's
laminar heat transfer coefficient, lb/hr-ft2
insulation conductivity in Btu/hr ft of
Reynolds number length, ft
mass of fuel
diffusion controlled mass loss rate, lb/ft2-sec
number of radiation shields
constant, vehicle nose performance coefficient
P stagnation pressure, lb/ft2
e
Pf local flow velocity, lb/ft
2
5
st
2heat flux, B/ft hr
radiant heat flow through the shields
aerodynamic heating rate
nose radius, ft
soil constant, depends on specific soil conditions
thickness in inches
t freestream velocity, fps
co
Uf local flow veloc ity, fps
V impact velocity, fps
V freestream velocity, fpsal
VT terminal velocity
W a constant
(3 hypersonic ballistic coeffic ient
flare angle taken as 450
P density of air at a specified altitude
Pal freestream density, lb/ft 3
P*\l* "Reference" dens i ty and viscosity
base value density and viscosity
cr stefan-Boltzmann constant
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4. REFERENCE DESIGN
The reference design of the radioisotope power supply is shown in
Fig. 4.1. The launch configuration shown here consists of three subassemblies.
These are the radioisotope heat source, the thermionic converter assembly,
and the safety equipment. The safety equipment is jettisoned after the
power supply is launched into a hyperbolic trajectory relative to the earth.
This leaves the flight configuration which consists of the heat source and
converter assembly. The separation of the safety equipment from the flight
configuration is illustrated in Fig. 4.2.
As shown in Fig. 4.1, the radioisotope heat source consists of the
radioisotope capsules and the capsule holder. The capsule holder is covered
w'ith thermal insulation to reduce heat leakage. The thermionic converter
assembly consists of:
1. The emitter heat pipes which remove heat from the radioisotope
capsules and concentrate it in the thermionic converters
2. The thermionic converters, which convert a portion of the isotopic
heat to electrical power
3. The electrical transmission lines which transmit the electrical
pow'er from the thermionic converters to the power conditioning
equipment
4. The radiator heat pipes which reject the waste heat, not converted
to electricity, to space
5. The beryllium neutron shield which protects sensitive components
in the payload and power conditioning equipment from radiation
damage
7
SEPARATION SPRING
iH SHIELDING
CAPSULE
BERYLLIUM SHIELD
HONEYCOMB
. LiH & Zr02 FIRE SHIELD
GUIDE RAILS
REENTRY THERMAL SHIELD
HELIUM COOLANT
CIRCULATION CHAMBER
EMITTER HEAT PIPE
PRESSURE SEAL BASE PLATE
a) OVERALL VIEW
AUXILIARY HEAT PIPE
THERMIONIC CONVERTER
Fig. 4.1. Radiosiotope thermionic power supply - launch configuration
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6. The extendible boom which moves the radioisotope power source
away from the payload and power conditioning after launch
7. The power conditioning equipment (not shown) which converts the
15 V output of the thermionic power source to the levels required
by the electric thrusters.
The safety equipment includes:
1. The auxiliary cooling heat pipes which remove heat from the radio-
isotope capsules prior to and during the launch
2. The containment shell which provides ·secondary containment of the
radioisotope and protects refractory metal components from oxi-
dation in the earth's atmosphere
3. The helium container and circulator to remove isotopic heat prior
to launch
4. The lithium hydride neutron shield to protect persons from neutron
radiation prior to launch or following launch aborts
5. The graphite reentry shield to protect against aerodynamic heating
following a high level launch abort
6. The aerodynamic flare which reduces the ballistic coefficient of
the power source and assures a stable reentry attitude
7. The zirconia felt thermal insulation and lithium hydride heat
absorber which protect the secondary containm~nt shell and
auxiliary cooling heat pipes from overheating during a launch pad
fire
II
8. The impact energy absorber which protects the secondary contain-
ment shell and other safety equipment from damage during impact on
on the earth I s surface.
The separation of the safety equipment from the heat source and con-
verter assembly is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. This separation is performed
after the power source has reached a hyperbolic trajectory and there is no
longer danger of reentry into the earth's atmosphere. Actuation of separation
of the safety shell from the flight configuration is by retraction of three
pins at the periphery of the aft bulkhead. The pins are actuated by pressu-
rized nitrogen stored in a small cylinder and slide in linear bearings to
reduce the frictional load. Since the system is designed to withstand a
launch pad fire, pyrotechnic devices for actuation or separation were ruled
out.
When the pins are retracted, a separation force is supplied by three
coil springs which are stored within the flare volume. During separation,
the flight system is guided along three rails so no side force is applied
at the moment of separation. The auxiliary cooling heat pipes slide out
from between the radioisotope capsules and the emitter heat pipes as the heat
source is withdrawn from the safety equipment. When the heat source is fully
removed, a hinged, insulated door closes over the end from which the auxiliary
heat pipes have been withdrawn, and the temperatures of the heat source and
converter assembly rise to their normal operating conditions.
The individual components of the heat source, thermionic converter
assembly, and safety equipment are described in detail in the following
sections. Section 4.1 deals with the flight configuration, while the safety
equipment is described in Section 4.2. The sequence of operations from
initial checkout to final electrically propelled flight is given in Section
4.3. Section 4.4 summarizes weight and power information for the radio-
isotope thermionic power source.
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4.1. FLIGHT CONFIGURATION
The radioisotope thermionic power source in the flight configuration is
illustrated in Fig. 4.3. Heat is generated in the radioisotope capsules
within the heat source. The capsules, at 2030oK, radiate their heat to
emitter heat pipes having their boiler section within the heat source. The
condenser end of each emitter heat pipe, which operates at 19000 K forms
the emitter of a thermionic converter in which electrical power is produced.
Wa.ste heat from the collector of each thermionic cell is transferred around
the beryllium neutron shield by a radiator heat pipe which radiates to space
at a temperature of lOOOoK.
The thermionic converters are interconnected in an electrical network.
Transmission lines connect to the positive and negative terminals of the
network and pass along the outside of the shield and waste heat radiator.
The transmission lines are insulated from the shield and radiator and reject
heat from electrical resistive losses directly to space, at a temperature of
about 370oK. The transmission lines pass through the base plate of the power
source to the power conditioning equipment. The power conditioning equip-
ment and the instrument payload are separated from the radioisotope power
source by a 6 meter boom to reduce radiation levels.
4.1.1 Heat Source
The heat source consists of the radioisotope capusles and the capsule
holder. The capsule holder is covered with thermal insulation to reduce
heat leakage from the heat source.
A portion of the heat source assembly including the emitter heat pipes
is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. There are one hundred and thirty-six 244Cm203
radioisotope capsules which radiate their heat to the 69 emitter heat pipes.
Shown in one sector of the illustration of the heat source in Fig. 4.4 is
the configuration at launch with auxiliary cooling heat pipes inserted be-
tween the capsules and emitter heat pipes. In the launch configuration the
isotopic heat is transferred to the auxiliary cooling heat pipes by a com-
bination of radiation and conduction through the helium gas which blankets
the heat source.
13
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The heat source is assembled within the array of auxiliary cooling heat
pipes in the safety equipment. The inner grid plate is placed over the heat
pipes in the safety equipment, and the capsules are inserted into the grid
plate as far as their retainer rings. After all of the capsules have been
inserted, the outer grid plate is placed over the capsules and attached to
the inner grid plate by screws which are located around some of the holes
through which the emitter heat pipes pass (the emitter heat pipes are not
present at this time).
The outer grid plate has attached to it a shroud which surrounds the
array of capsules and heat pipes. The shroud and the outer grid plate are
covered with multi-foil thermal insulation (Refs. 2,3). The characteristics
of the thermal insulation are given in Table 4.1. The corner between the
cylindrical and flat sections of insulation is made by interleaving tabs
from the cylindrical section with sheets from the flat section. This method
of assembly has been shown by recent experiments to minimize heat leakage
from the corners (Ref. 4).
TABLE 4.1
THERMAL INSULATION DATA
Type
Foil material
Foil thickness
Particle material
Most common particle sizes
Maximum particle size
Average oxide layer thickness
Average oxide coating density
Multi-Foil
Tungsten
0.0013 em
Th02
15-25 J.l
'" 50 J.l
8.3 J.l
0.055 mg/cm2
As shown in Fig 4.4, the outer grid plate is attached to structural
members. The structure consists of W-25% Re studs 0.42 em in diameter pene-
trating the thermal insulation which are connected to trusses. This structure
supports the heat source during launch and spaces the heat source from the
beryllium neutron shield in the flight configuration. Three stainless steel
16
rods are attached at 1200 spacings to the end of the support structure which
rests against the neutron shield. These rods pass over the outside edge of
the neutron shield and are attached to the base plate of the converter as-
sembly in the flight configuration. They hold the heat source against the
beryllium neutron shield during electrically propelled flight.
When the safety equipment is jettisoned, the auxiliary cooling heat
pipes are removed from one end of the heat source. To reduce heat leakage
from this end of the heat source, an ins~ated door, shown in Fig 4.5, is
used. The door is designed to swing shut and latch remotely. Multi-foil
insulation is attached to the outside of the door. The joint between the
insulation on the door and the insulation on the shroud is a tapered corner,
which has been shown to allow minimum heat leakage of joints which can be
made without pre-assembly (Ref. 2). The door is in three sections joined by
hinges, to permit it to fit in a small space between the outside of the heat
source and the inner wall of the safety equipment. The inner wall of the
safety equipment is shown in phantom in Fig. 4.5. The insulation is con-
tinuous across the entire door.
4.1.2. Radioisotope Capsule
The design of the isotope capsule is shown in Fig. 4.6. The capsule is
fabricated entirely of tungsten-25% rhenium alloy. This alloy has been
selected because of its refractory nature, its relatively good fabricability,
and its compatibility with c~03(Ref. 5). The capsule is fabricated by
electron beam welding a bottom assembly and a retainer ring to a length of
tubing. The ftnal closure after fuel is inserted is made by TIG welding a
cap into the end of the capsule. The bottom assembly consists of a foil
rupture disk backed up by a porous plug. The porous plug prevents loss of
fuel after the rupture disk has been ruptured by helium pressure.
The capsule was sized to allow adequate volume for helium accumulation
prior to launch. It is fueled with 137 gm (325 W) of 244c~03. It can be
sealed more than 150 days before launch without excessive helium pressure
buildup. When a capsule is heated to 17000 K at 150 days after sealing, the
17
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Fig. 4.5. Heat source door
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stress in the walls will build up to 1.5 x 108 N/m2 (27,000 psi), which is
only 60% of the yield strength of tungsten-25% rhenium at 170~K. This
indicates that the capsule can be sealed 150 days before launch without helium
pressure causing damage.
4.1.3. Converter Assembly
The converter assembly consists of 69 thermionic converters, each
attached to an emitter heat pipe to transfer heat to the thermionic emitter,
a collector heat pipe to remove heat from the thermionic collector, and a
radiator heat pipe to reject the waste heat to space. The converter modules
are interconnected in a series-parallel network by electrical leads. Also
included in the converter assembly are electrical transmission lines, a
neutron radiation shield, and'structure including an extendible boom.
4.1.4. Emitter Heat Pipe
The emitter heat pipe carries heat from the isotope heat source to the
thermionic converter. Components of the heat pipe are illustrated in Fig. 4.7
where it is shown as the emitter of the thermionic converter. The parameters
and dimensions are summarized in Table 4.2. The tungsten heat pipe is fabri-
cated by chemical vapor deposition. The tungsten end cap is EB welded after
filling the heat pipe with lithium working fluid. The porous tube, which
separates the liquid and vapor, is fabricated of several layers of tungsten
wire mesh, diffus ion bonded together in the manner developed by Kemme
(Ref. 6). In the evaporator region of the heat pipe, which is inserted
inside the heat source, the surface is grooved to increase the thermal ab-
sorptivity as described in Section 5.1.1.
The condenser end of the heat pipe, which forms the emitter of the
thermionic converter, is covered by a 10 mil layer of tungsten deposited by
hydrogen reduction of tungsten hexachloride. The chloride-deposited tungsten
is oriented with the lllOl crystal planes on the surface. This produces a
vacuum work function of 4.8 to 5 volts for the tungsten emitter and results
in high thermionic power density and conversion efficiency (Ref. 7). A
20
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Fig. 4.7. Thermionic converter
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TABLE 4.2
PAMMETERS OF EMITTER HEAT PIPES
LD. porous tube
O.D. porous tube
LD. heat pipe wall
O.D. heat pipe
Width of annulus
Thermal limits of heat pipe
Based upon liquid annulus
Based upon vapor flow region
Groove geometry
30° included angle
Groove width
Groove fillet
Groove depth in heat pipe wall
Tungsten emissivity @ 19000 K
Effective emissivity of tungsten
walls grooved with above dimensions
22
0.57 em
0.60 em
0.673 em
0.85 em
0.037 em
1500 watts
3000 watts
0.038 em (0.015 in. )
0.013 em (0.005 in. )
0.376 em (0.0148 in.)
0.24
0.55
tungsten emitter stem, which isa portion of the thermionic converter (see
Section 4.1.5) is joined to the emitter heat pipe by an electron-beam weld.
4.1. 5. Thermionic Converters
The thermionic converter is illustrated in Fig. 4.7, and the dimensions
and operating parameters are given in Table 4.3. The thermionic emitter is
formed by vapor deposition of a layer of tungsten with preferred crystal
TABLE 4.3
CONVERTER PARAMETERS
Emitter Diameter, cm
Emitter Length, em
Emitter Wall Thickness, em
Interelectrode Spacing, em
Collector Thickness, cm
Collector Heat Pipe Wall Thickness, cm
oEmitter Temperature, K
0.98
5·0
0.127
0.02
0.127
0.064
1900
orientation ~llO}on the end of the emitter heat pipe. It is connected to
a tungsten emitter stem which serves as a heat choke and an electrical con-
nector from the emitter. The emitter stem is diffusion bonded to a heavy
tantalum transition piece to which the positive electrical lead is connected.
The transition piece is welded onto the upper niobium skirt of the insulator
seal. The lower skirt of the seal is welded to the top of the niobium col-
lector. The series electrical lead is integral with the collector. It
is connected to the emitter lead of the next converter in series as described
in Section 4.1.8.
Heat is removed from the collector by the annular collector heat pipe.
This heat pipe transfers heat from the collector to the long radiator heat
pipe, whose end is brazed in the socket below the converter. Cesium pres-
sure in the converter is maintained by the graphite sorption reservoir in
the recess in the insulator below the emitter.
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4.1.6. §pace Radiator
The heat rejected from each collector is radiated to space from a
heat pipe which is brazed into a socket in the collector heat pipe. The
radiator heat pipes are assembled to form a cone-shaped radiator. These
pipes are mounted on, but electrically insulated from, a set of rings as
shown in Fig. 4.1. Parameters describing these radiator heat pipes are listed
in Table 4.4.
TABLE 4.4
PARAMETERS FOR SPACE RADIATOR
Number of pipes
Heat load per pipe (Beginning of life)
Operating temperature
Heat pipe fluid
Pipe o.d.
Pipe Ld.
Porous tube o.d.
Porous tube i.d.
Heat Transfer eapaeity at 1000Q K (Ref. 8)
Overall length
Heated length
Required radiator length
Clearance betw~en pipes at diameter
of end of shieid (33.8 cm)
Total mass of 69 pipes
4.1.7. Neutron Shield
69
555 w"atts
10000K
Potassium
1.15 em
1.04 cm
1.00 cm
0.97 cm
940 w"atts
141 cm
3.75 cm
111 cm
0.388 cm
8.3 kg
The neutron shield is included in the flight configuration to protect
sensitive electronic equipment from radiation damage. It is fabricated of
beryllium metal by powder metallurgy processes. Its shape is a conical
frustrum with a cone angle of 2.gP, a height of 24 em, and base diameters of
29.1 and 31.6 em. The radiator heat pipes are angled to the periphery of the
shield and then continue aft to the space radiator.
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4.1.8. Electrical Connections
The 69 thermionic converters are arranged in a series-parallel network
with 23 in series and 3 in parallel as shown in fig. 4.8. The electrical net-
work allows a buildup in the voltage to a terminal output of 15 volts by con-
nection of 23 cells in series. The parallel cross connections in the network
minimize the effects of the failure of an individual thermionic converter.
Should the cesium vapor leak out of an individual thermionic converter
or an emitter heat pipe fail, the converter will no longer be able to con-
duct high currents. In the event of this "open-circuit" failure, current in
the network is carried by those converters in parallel with the open-circuit
converter. The parallel cells will continue to generate power although there
will be same loss of output due to the higher current density. A number of
analytical studies (Refs. 9-11) have demonstrated the effectiveness of this
series-parallel network connection scheme in maintaining high electrical
output and high voltage output in spite of cell failures.
The series electrical connection is via the emitter stem and the lead
which is integral with the collector of the thermionic converter. These are
illustrated in fig. 4.8. The electrical connection is initially a mechanical
one, with a diffusion bond formed at the operating temperature of the joint.
'l1he tantalum emitter lead of one converter is attached to the niobium col-
lector lead of the next converter by molybdenum screws. When the thermionic
converters are heated to their normal. operating conditions, differential ex-
pansion between the molybdenum screw and the tantalum and niobium lead
materials tightens the joint. Diffusion bonding of the leads is activated
by a thin foil of nickel placed between the tantalum and niobium surfaces.
This method of bonding is similar to that which has been used successfully
in the testing of a four-cell cluster of electrically heated converters
connected in a series-parallel network (Ref. 12). Parallel cross connectors
of niobium are attached over the emitter leads by the same process.
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4.1.9. Transmission Lines and Boom
The electrical transmission lines carry current between the electricaJ.
network of thermionic converters and the power conditioning equipment which
is located adjacent to the payload. The transmission lines are flexible
multi-strand aluminum wire. The lines are sized to radiate the ohmic heating
of' 200 W (100 W per line) to space at an average temperature of 373°K. The
transmission lines are on the outside of the neutron shield and radiator heat
pipes and are insulated from these high temperature components. They pass
through ceramic-to-metal seals in the base plate of the power source. The
sections of the transmission lines between the base plate and the power
conditioning equipment are coiled between these two components in the launch
configuration, and are extended when the boom is extended.
The retractable boom which separates the power source from the power
conditioning equipment and payload is a preformed foil which is rolled on a
drum in the launch configuration. When extended it forms a hollow tube 1.27
em in diameter by 0.025 em wall thickness. It is 7.4 m long and provides
a total separation distance between the heat source and the power conditi~ning
equipment of 8.6 m.
4.1.10. Power Conditioning
Power conditioning requirements were analyzed to provide an estimate of
the mass and efficiency of the system. A modular design approach was used
in which an independent power processing module handled the power requirements
of each thruster.
The system selected consists of 8 modules and thruster units, 7 operat-
ing and one standby at the start of the mission and 3 standby, or failed, and
5 operating at the end of the mission. The main power conditioning circuit
in each module is the beam power supply which processes about 800 watts to
1500 volts. The analysis evaluated the beam power supply, and it is assumed
that the resulting mass and efficiency is typical of the entire power process-
ing requirement.
Two inverter circuits were evaluated, both using silicon power trans-
istors. A design using a "push-pull" circuit with a single primary transformer
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resulted in slightly lower mass but also a lower efficiency. The basic circuit
chosen for the reference design (Fig. 4.9) uses a center tap transformer re-
quiring two primary windings which allows passing the input current through a
single swit~hing branch minimizing the transistor losses.
Time ratio control (pulse width modulation) is assumed for source
voltage control over a small range to handle BOL to EOL variation or changes
in the thermionic performance.
A sunnnary of power conditioning parameters is given in Table 4.5. The
mass includes all components, wires, heat sinks and radiating panel, and base
drive circuitry.
'" 20
12 kHz
60 watts
17 watts
89%
3.3 kg
4.1 kg/kW
TABLE 4.5
POWER CONDITIONING PARAMETERS
Westinghouse 1441-0410 Si
1000C
Specific mass
*Factor of reduction below maximum rated power dissipation.
Transistor
Transistor case temperature
Transistor power dissipation
derating factor*
Inverter frequency
Inverter loss
Transformer loss
Module Efficiency
Module mass
4.2. SAFETY EQUIPMENT
The safety equipment is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. It provides for
auxiliary cooling of the radioisotope heat source before and during launch
and following a possible launch abort. The safety equipment also provides
secondary containment for the radioisotope fUel and seals the heat source
and converter assembly in a protective helium gas environment. Another
important fUnction of the safety equipment is to provide neutron shielding
to reduce radiation levels around the radioisotope power source thereby
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Fig. 4.9. Basic pow~r conditioning module circuit
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reducing hazards to people in the event of impact on land after a launch
abort. A large portion of the safety equipment is designed to protect the
secondary containment, auxiliary cooling system, and neutron radiation
shielding from damage due to possible launch abort conditions. A blast
shield and a fire shield protect against an explosion or fire on the launch
pad. An aerodynamic flare stabilizes the orientation in the event of reen-
try and Pyrocarb ablative material protects exposed surfaces from reentry
heating. Crushable honeycomb is included to absorb the energy of impact on
land.
4.2.1. Auxiliary Cooling System
The auxiliary cooling system consists of 408 auxiliary heat pipes and
a circulating helium system. The heated ends of the auxiliary heat pipes
are inserted between the radioisotope capsules in the heat source as illus-
trated in Fig. 4.4. Heat is transferred from the capsule to the heat pipes
by a combination of radiation and conduction through the helium gas.
The parameters of the potassium-filled auxiliary heat pipes are given
in Table 4.6. As shown here, they contain a noncondensible gas which tends
to accumulate in the cooled end of the heat pipe and varies the length of the
heat pipe with temperature and power. The noncondensible gas smooths thermal
transients during startup of the heat pipe and during the transition between
heat rejection to the circulating helium coolant and heat rejection to space
or the surroundings via the auxiliary radiator.
During prelaunch operations, helium is circulated through the chamber
above the heat source with a flow rate of 4.32(10)5 cm3/sec (284 Ibm/hr) and
a tempe;rature rise of 278°K (500°F). At the time of launch, the helium inlet
and outlet pipes are disconnected.
4.2.2. Neutron Shielding
The neutron shielding which is a part of the safety equipment is in
two sections. A cylindrical shell of lithium hydride surrounds the sides
30
TABLE 4.6
AUXILIARY HEAT PIPE PARAMEn'ERS
No. of pipes
Tube wall material
o.d. tube
i .d. tube wall
o.d. porous tube
Ld. porous tube
Heated radiator length at
9000 K
Length of noncondensible gas
at 9000 K
Operating temperature with
cooling by helium
Total mass of 408 pipes
31
414
SS 316
0.73 em
0.71 em
0.63 em
0.60 em
103.5 em
39.5 em
76cfK
32.5 kg
of the heat source and a curved disc of lithium hydride covers one end of
the heat source. The other end is covered by the beryllium neutron shield
which is a part of the converter assembly. The sections of lithium hydride
shielding are configured and' arranged to provide a minimum of' 10 em of
Iithium hydride or equivalent.
Data in Ref. 13 indicates that 10 em of lithium hydride can reduce
the fast neutron dose by a factor of about 3.5. The 10 em thickness of
Iithium hydride around the source reduces the dose at 1 m from the center
of the source to 15.5 rem/hour.
In the abort mode, the lithium hydride will reach a maximum tempera-
ture of 120cPK. At this temperature the vaporization and dissociation pres-
sure of hydrogen is 1. 5 atmospheres. The LiH containment tank is designed
to withstand this internal pressure at 1200oK, and the stainless steel is com-
patible with hydrogen and LiH, thus, no loss of LiH is expected.
4.2.3. Secondary Containment Vessel
The secondary containment vessel is made up of the heated ends of the
auxiliary heat pipes, the tube sheet across the top of the heat source into
which the heat pipes are brazed, the inside wall of the lithium hydride
container, the conical structure around the flight radiator, and the base
plate of the converter assembly (which is part of the flight configuration).
This base plate is sealed to the remainder of the secondary containment
vessel (Which is part of the safety equipment) by a peripheral seal. This
joint is separated during jettison of the safety equipment by a retraction
of the three separation pins.
The portion of the secondary containment vessel which is part of the
safety equipment is.backed up by an outer vessel. This vessel is penetrated
by the helium lines which have self sealing, quick disconnect fittings.
Because of these penetrations, the outer vessel does not qualif'y as a con-
tainment vessel. It does provide a significant safety margin, however, on
secondary containment of the radioisotope.
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4.2.4. Reentry Shield and Aerodynamic Flare
The hemispherical nose, the cylindrical section, and the aerodynamic
flare are protected from aerodynamic heating by a layer of Zirconia felt
insulation covered by Pyro-carb 406. The thickness of these layers varies
depending on location. The heating rates and protection system thickness
are described in Sections 5.3 and 6.3.
The aerodynamic flare reduces the baJ.listic coefficient of the power
supply and safety equipment thereby reducing aerodynamic heating rates and
temperature s during reentry (See Sections 5.3 and 6.3.) and reducing the
velocity on impact. The aerodynamic flare also causes the center of pressure
of the reentering power source to be far aft of its center of mass. This
causes the power source to align its axis with the air flow direction at
high altitudes before aerodynamic heating rates become significant. The
oriented reentry prevents severe heating of the cylinderical side walls.
4.2.5. Impact Energy Absorber
Energy absorbing material is provided to protect the system from
damage in the event of impact upon land after a failure in the launch
sequence. The energy absorbing material in the nose region of the safety
package is 73.4 em of crushable aluminum honeycomb. Characteristics of this
material are discussed in Section 6.4.1. The honeycomb is designed to absorb
the energy of impact at a terminal velocity of 45 m/sec (147 ft/sec) with a
maximum rate of deceleration of 200 gls. The structural components in the
system have been designed to withstand this decelaration rate with no
damage being inflicted on the auxiliary cooling system.
4.2.6. Structural COlII.Ponents and Blast Shield
The structural cOllI.Ponents of the radioisotope electric propulsion
system have been designed to withstand shock and vibration environment of
the launch by the Titan 3D/Centaur combination and for possible impac~ upon
land after a launch abort. The configuration of the structural components
is shown in Fig. 4.1.
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The structural material of the components has been selected as SS-316
which results in a total structural weight of 128 kg (283 Ib). It would be
possible to reduce this weight by a factor of 2 with the selective use of
beryllium, titanium, and aluminum; however, since this structure is associated
with the jettisonable safety package, a weight penalty has been accepted to
gain simplicity of fabrication. A summary of the key components of the
structure, their nominal thicknesses and approximate weights is given in
Table 4.7.
TABLE 4.7
STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
(All material - SS 316)
Component Thickness Mass
Outer Shell
Upper support cone
Low'er support cone
Insulated rings
Heat pipe support rings
Keyed rings
Latches
Trusses between shield and
heat source
Fixtures at payload inter-
face
LiH containment tanks
Hardware and bonding
material
0.152 cm (0.06 in.)
0.3175 cm (0.125 in.)
0.223 cm (0.08 in.)
0.127 cm (0.05 in.)
0.127 cm (0.05 in.)
0.3175 cm (0.125 in.)
0.254 cm (0.1 in.)
0.254 em (0.1 in.)
0.152 cm (0.06 in.)
TOTAL
30.7 kg (67.6 It)
3.6 kg (8 Ib)
12 .3 kg (27 1b)
1.6 kg (3.5 Ib)
2.7 kg (6 Ib)
8.6 kg (19 Ib)
2.7 kg (6 Ib)
2.3 kg (5 Ib)
1.1 kg (2.5 Ib)
56.4 kg (124 Ib)
6.4 kg (14 Ib)
128.4 kg (282.6 Ib)
The base of both the flight system and the safety package are protected by
a blast shield from shrapnel and overpressure during a booster explosion.
The blast shield thickness determination.is discussed in Section 6.2.
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4.2.7. Launch Pad Fire Protecti.on System
A solid propellant launch pad fire protection shield is located around
the auxiliary radiator heat pipes, as shown in Fig. 4.1. The shield consists
of an outer layer of zirconia felt 0.31 em (O.l20inch) thick and an inner
layer of lithium hydride 1.9 em ~0.75-inch) thick (section 6.1.2.). It is
designed to limit the maximum temperature of the radiator heat pipes to
1200°K (1700° F) when exposed to 260cf K (425cf F) fire for ten minutes, and
when lying on the surface of the earth and transferring the 44.2 Kw (th)
of internal heat to the atmosphere. The zirconia is surrounded by a Pryo-
carb layer for reentry protection which does not significantly influence the
launch pad fire protection.
The purpose of the Zirconia insulation is to lower the heat input
to the LiH heat storage material outside the heat pipes. Thicknesses of
each material were selected considering both optimum mass and temperature
drop. The allowable temperature drop across the shield is 30d' K, which
represents the difference between the equilibrium surface temperature of the
radiator in air (9000 K) and the allowable temperature of the heat pipes
(12000 K). The overall mass of the Zr02/LiH fire shield and stainless steel
structure is 67.5 kg. In comparison, a launch escape system to remove the
RTPS from the fire would have a mass of 290 kg, lower reliability and greater
design impact on the launch vehicle.
4.3. OPERATING SEQUENCE
The procedures for assembly and disassembly of the radioisotope
thermionic power supply and the sequence of operations during a normal
launch and possible launch aborts are described in the following sections.
All of the operations described are performed on the launch configuration
power supply shown in Fig. 4.1, or on portions of this power supply.
4.3.1. Final Assembly of the Launch Configuration
The loading of the, isotope capsules and the final assembly of the
generator in the launch configuration is performed in a helium-filled glove
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box environment. The safety equipment is placed in the glove box with the
axis horizontal. Helium lines are attached at the quick disconnect coup-
lings and cooled helium is circulated through the chamber in the safety
equipment. The radioisotope capsules and all other parts of the power
supply are placed in the glove box.
The inner grid plate (See Fig. 4.4) is inserted into the safety equip-
ment and aligned with the pins on the ends of several of the auxiliary heat
pipes. After all of the capsules have been loaded, the outer grid plate with
the attached insulated shroud and insulated door is placed over the capsules
and attached to the inner grid plate. The converter assembly is then inserted
in the safety equipment to within 1 em of full insertion. At this point, the
rods from the heat source support structure are attached to the base plate
of the converter assembly. This temporarily withdraws the heat source from
the auxiliary cooling system by 1 em. When the rods have been connected,
the converter assembly with the heat source is inserted fully in the safety
equipment and the separation pins are inserted to close the peripheral seal.
The seal is checked for leak-tightness prior to opening the glove box to
remove the assembled generator. All of these operations are performed semi-
remotely from behing water or polyethylene shielding using long handled tools.
4-3.2. Assembly and Disassembly for Testing
The generator is assembled in the launch configuration in the same
manner as described in Section 4.3.1. It is sealed with helium inside during
transfer from the fueling facility to the test chamber. The test chamber is
evacuated prior to opening the sealed launch configuration. The base seal is
opened remotely, releasing the helium gas contained inside. The flight con-
figuration is then removed from the safety equipment. After it is completely
removed, the heat source door is released and swings shut. At this point, .
temperatures rise to the operating conditions and the test begins.
At the conclusion of the test, the vacuum chamber is back-filled with
purified helium gas. The heat source door is removed by pulling out the
hinge pin. The radioisotope power source is then inserted into the safety
equipment to within 1 em of full insertion. The rods attaching the heat
source to the base plate of the converter assembly are disconnected and
attached to the safety equipment. The converter assembly is then inserted
fully into the safety equipment and the separation pins are engaged. The
assembled generator is leak checked prior to removal from the vacuum chamber
for transportation to the fueling and defue1ing faci1it,y.
The defue1ing operation is performed by reversing the procedures
followed in final assembly. The converter assembly is first removed from
the safety equipment and heat source. The outer grid plate and shroud are
then removed from the heat source, and the isotope capsules are removed one
by one.
4.3.3. Launch and Flight
The power source is assembled in the launch configuration as described
in Section 4.3.1 after being pretested as described in section 4.3.2. In
transportation to the launch site, the power source is mounted in a shipping
container which incorporates neutron shielding and a helium circulation and
cooling system. It is mated to the payload and the Centaur with auxiliary
shielding maintained in place around the power source. Shortly before
launching, after the site has been cleared of personnel, the auxiliary
shielding is removed. The helium lines are disconnected remotely a few
seconds prior to launch.
Following burnout of the Centaur, the attainment of a hyperbolic
trajectory is verified from tracking data. The mechanism for separation of
the safety equipment is armed and actuated by ground command. After success-
ful jettison of the safety equipment is verified, the heat source door is
released and swung shut by the spring and the boom is deployed. The payload
and propulsion system are separated from the Centaur and the electric thrusters
are started up.
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4.4 SYSTEM MASS AND POWER SUMMARY
Figure 4.10 illustrates the overall dimensions of the launch system
and the major components of the radioisotope thermionic power supply at the
reference design power level.
A sunnnary of the masses of the major components of the system is
given in Table 4.8. From this table it is seen that the total mass at launch
is 723.8 kg while the mass of the extended mission flight system is 148.5 kg.
The estimated uncertainty in the safety system mass of 90 kg is primarily
due to difference between the final system mass and that used for the aero-
dynamic heating analysis. This mass difference will result in a higher
ballistic coefficient and an increase in aerodynamic heating, unless the
flare diameter is also increased (Section 6.3.1.2). An increase in flare
diameter between 244 em and 305 em would compensate for this difference
with an attendent increase in structure and graphite mass of up to 90 kg.
Since the safety system is ejected early in the heliocentric phase of the
mission, this mass uncertainty should not have a significant effect on
payload mass.
A sunnnary of the electrical power output from the system at beginning-
of-life (BOL) and end-of-life (EOL), after 36,000 hOurs, is shown in Table 4.9.
TABLE 4.9
ELECTRICAL PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
Number of operating converters
Net output (kWe)
Overall efficiency (%)
Total thermal po'W"er (kWt)
Voltage to P.C. (volts)
BOL
69
5·93
13.4
44.2
15.2
EOL
59
5.0
13.2
37.77
14.9
113.8
Cm
o
1.9
75·3
85·3
100.2
113.8
156.7
164.7
192·7
_--'- .......,~I-~ll
If-.N:~-----216.8
244 Cm
~~~~~~~------~--- 279.7
256.8
L
Fig. 4.10. Overall dimensions of launch configuration
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TABLE 4.8
SYSTEM COMPONENT MASSES
A. Extended Mission System
Curium isotope capsules
Emitter heat pi~es
Thermionic diode components
Space radiator heat pipes
Structure for space radiator
Beryllium shield
Heat source structure and insulation
Transmission lines and boom
Power conditioning
Blast shield
Flight System Total
B. Disposable Safety System
Graphite and insulation on nose
Graphite on cylindrical body
Graphite and insulation on flare
Aluminum honeycomb
Zirconia/LiH fire shield
Aerodynamic flare structure
LiH shielding
Auxiliary heat pipes
Launch and impact structure
Jettison mechanisms (EST)
Helium baffle
Titanium blast shield
Electronic recovery aids
Safety System Total*
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS
29.2 kg
9.0 kg
6.4 kg
6.3 kg
3.2 kg
24.1 kg
15.5 kg
18.9 kg
30.0 kg
5.9 kg
148.5 kg
11.3 kg
17.0 kg
123.7 kg
25.1 kg
67.5 kg
35.7 kg
78.6 kg
32.5 kg
128.4 kg
12.8 kg
2.3 kg
25.8 kg
14.6 kg
575.3 kg
723.8 kg
*Mass of the safety system is uncertain by approximately 90 kg due to
design tolerances in the aerodynamic flare diameter and graphite
thickness (Vol. II, Sections 4.4 and 6.3.3.2.).
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5. AEROSPACE NUCLEAR SAFETY
5.1. SAFETY CRITERIA
The aerospace nuclear safety philos~phy currently employed by
the USAEC is complete containment of the radioisotope fuel during all normal
and accident environments. Specifically, the major safety criteria considered
in this study were:
• Containment during a launch pad abort of a Titan IIID/Centaur vehicle,
including survival during a lO-minute 26000 K solid propellant fire
environment
• Safety System protection during an ascent abort and resulting
explosion s9hrapnel'
'. Fuel and Safety System protection for worst-case atmospheric reentry
trajectorie's
• Fuel structural and thermal protection during terminal velocity
impact onto land
• Radiation shielding to m1n1m1ze exposure of operating personnel
and persons in the vicinity of an aborted system.
All of these des ign criteria were met us.ing pass ive and redundant components,
which are listed in Table 5.1.
As noted in Ref. 1, these criteria were established considering that
the mission profile calls for direct insertion of the radioisotope power
supply into a heliocentric orbit with no requirement for reentry and
retrieval, except in the case of launch aborts. No suitable guidelines could
be found concerning acceptable radiation exposure to persons in the vicinity
of an impact on land. However, it has been estimated that recovery could be
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TABLE 5·1
RTPS SAFETY PACKAGE SUBSYSTEMS
1. Passive orientated reentry aeroshell with spherical nose and aero-
dynamic flare
2. Pyro-Carb ablator with zirconia felt insulation backing for re-
entry protection
3. Auxiliary heat pipe radiator and LiH neutron shield
4. Auxiliary radiator solid propellant fire protection shield
5. Honeycomb terminal velocity impact energy absorber
6. Launch pad helium circulation cooling chamber
7. Blast shield for fragment protection
8. Location aids for land and water impact
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accomplished in 12 hours, as discussed in Section 5.6, which would reduce the
maximum exposure to persons within 3 meters to less than 25 rem - the maximum
whole body dose for reactor siting studies.
5.2. LAUNCH PAD EXPLOSION AND FIRE
Launch abort environments for the RTPS were modeled after those
presently employed for Space Nuclear Systems, such as the TRANSIT and Pioneer
RTG's and the Isotope Brayton System (Refs. 14-16). Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present
typical composite launch phase abort environments for the TRANSIT and MHW
Multi-Hundred watt) RTGs. These two models are relatively consistent for peak
static overpressures resulting from explosion of the upper stage and for
shrapnel velocities. However, fragment sizes vary considerably primarily
due to the much smaller sized payload and upper stage for TRANSIT.
The solid propellant fire environment is also comparable for the two models,
although the 10 minute duration for the Titan IIIC is believed to be more
representative of a Titan IIID vehicle. A specific abort accident environ-
ment for the Titan llID vehicle, or for the Viking Mission,presently does
not exist.
5.2.1. Launch Pad Thermal Environment
Thermal environments for a Titan III launch pad fire are summarized in
Table 5.4. Heat input from the liquid propellants was determined by numeri-
cally integrating the curve in Fig. 5.1, which assumes the Sandia acci-
dent model and the Titan III propellant mass. Two solid propellant fire
models are given, and apply for the safety system falling close to or in
contact with segments of burning propellants. These models are based on
recent nuclear systems accident studies.
Heat input values in Table 5.4 assume a view factor of 0.9 for radiant
heat input to the active radiator surface. To illustrate the magnitude of
the fire heat input, these values are ratioed by the heat source power
generation over the predicted fire duration.
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TABLE 5.3
SUMMARY OF COMPOSITE ABORT ENVIRONMENTS FOR THE MHW HEAT SOURCE
Situation Component
Ground Ilandl1ng
Fire
Icnnet
Launch Pad Accident
Liquid Fire
Fireball Liftoff
AfterHre
Solid Fire
Temp.
l>"..Jration
Blast
Overpressure
Static
Stagnation
Reflected
Impulse
Duration
Velocity
Yield
Fragments
Sheet
Size
Velocity
COmponents
Weitht
Velocity
• Q\cmical
Uquid Fire
Atmosphere
Duration
Solid Fire
Atmosphere
Duration
Impact-velocitv
Asce~t-to-Orbit Aborts
Firestream-duration
Explosion
Fragments
Post A>crt Re-entry
Ballistic
Velocity
Angle
as Configuration
Orbit Decay
Velocity
Angle
as Configuration
Elliptical Orbit
Velocity
Angle
RS Conf1lZura tion
[arth Impact
Velocity
Surfaces
HS Con(ilZuratlon
Po.t Impact
1laactanta
Fire
Burial
Dominant
Mission
or
Vehicle
All t:tssions
Saturn V
Titan lIIC
Saturn V
Saturn V
Saturn V
Titan IIIC
Saturn V
All Missions
Earth orbit
Missions or
those using
parking orbit
Lunar Mission
All Miuions
All Hluions
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Environment Definition
1475 ~r, £.- 0.9, 30 ~n.
30 foot drop, unyiel~~r~f~a~e~e ~
12 seconds
1 hour, 1875 or, E· 0.9
4250 or
10 minutes
S-IVE 5-11 S-le
840 psi 280 psi 205 -;:11
2700 psi 780 psi 550 psi
6800 psi 1900 psi 1350 psi
8.2 psi-sec. 5.5 psi-sec 7.5 psi-sec
. _ 39 :nsec 19.5 msee 7 msee
7750 fps 4800 Cps 4200 Cps
20 7. 207. 207.
1 in2 to 210 ft 2
300 fps to 3500 fps
I lb to 200 Ib
100 fps to JOO fps
A120], AlC12 , Cl,CO,C02,H2,HCl,H20,N2 ,OH10 mIn.
160 fos
25 sec.
~ Pad accident
...,Pad accident
<.25,570 Cps
Variable
Full heat source
25,570 t.,s
00
Full hea t source
~ 36,675 Cps
"" 0 - 900
rull hea t source
II
200 - 400 fps (depends on~ )
water,solls,concrete, granite
full heat source (ablated\
.oils,water (saline and fresh)
1475 of, (hours) undergrowth. treeS
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Fig. ').1. Liquid propellant fireball radiant heat flux and
temperature for a Titan III launch abort
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For the present study the worst-case thermal environment, in terms of
total heat input, was assumed for the heat shield design - 26000 K for 10
minutes. Concepts considered to protect the safety package in this environ-
ment included:
1. High Cp heat shield materials
2. Insulat ion blankets
3. Thermal switch materials
4. Concentric radiation shields
5. Composite insulation/heat storage shields.
The latter approach was the only method found acceptable from both a thermal
protection and total mass standpoint. Each of these concepts will be dis-
cussed in Section 6.1.
5.2.2. Fragment Environment
Experimental fragment velocity distributions are shown in Figs. 5.2
and 5.3 which were extracted from Ref.17. The quantity of propellant for
these cases is comparable to the Centaur Stage. Consequently, this data is
believed to be applicable to predicting fragment velocities for the present
stUdy.
Table 5.5 shows the fragment environment postulated for the Pioneer
Mission, which employs a Centaur upper stage. These components and velo-
cities represent potential projectiles for design of a fragment shield.
Because of the great uncertainty in designing a fragment shield and
the potentially astronomical mass penalty associated with one, the approach
taken for the RTPS was to use existing shield technology based on empirical
49
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results. Assuming that the RTPS is mounted with the flare base towards the
launch vehicle, the 25 em beryllium shield will provide adequate protection
for the fuel capsules. The primary purpose of a blast shield is to protect
the aerodynamic flare and auxiliary radiator from damage. Since the flare
stucture will adequately shield the radiator, due to its composite stainless
steel/insulation/graphite construction, the main concern is excessive damage
to the flare. Consequently, the approach taken has been to place a thin
titanium fragment shield at the aft end of the system to attenuate high
energy fragments and provide partial protection to the flare. Alternate
blast shield concepts are discussed in Section 6.2.
5.2.3. Overpressures
The overpressure environment for the Titan IIID/Centaur was predicted
using data presented in the TRANSIT Safety Analysis Report (Ref. 14). The
method used requires the equivalent TNT yield and a computed reduced dis-
tance scaling parameter A, where
D distance from the blast center
W equivalent propellant yield.
Curves in the TRANSIT Safety Report give A vs overpressure based on test data
and TNT models developed by Brode, Kingery and Kinney (Ref. 14). For a
worst-case condition, a maximum probable yield for the hypergolic propellants
(Stages I and II) is on the order of 5%, while 20% can be taken as a maximum
for the LOX/LH propellant in the Centaur Stage (Ref. 18). The expected peak
static overpressures at the radioisotope heat source for the reference design
are tabulated below.
Stage
Stage I
stage III
Centaur
Distance from
Explos ion Center
to Heat Source
(ft) (m)
115 35
68 21
50 15
Propellant
Weight
(lb)
413,000
70,700
30,100
52
A
(ft/lbl / 3)
4.19.
4.46
2·75
Cps i)
65
54
150
(nli)
4.5(10)5
3.7(10)5
10.3(10)5
These overpressures are believed to be extremely conservative because of the
high yields assumed and neglect of intermediate mass attenuat ion. Experi-
mental overpressure from aborts of the Saturn S-IVB and Atlas/Centaur at
15 meters were 50 psi and 20 psi respectively.
The overpressure environment for the Pioneer mission was 530 psi with
a peak pressure impulse of 1060 ps i-ms. These values were based on the
Centaur vehicle and a separation distance of 38 .5 m and thus scaled to
somewhat higher pressures than those above.
The fire shield and outer structure is designed to withstand these
predicted launch pad overpressures. Lower pressures will be experienced
during a high altitude abort, although no estimate has been made of the
expected magnitude. However, it is expected that the fragment environment
effects will be considerably more severe than overpressure effects.
5 ·3. REENTRY AND AEROTHERMODYNAMICS
5.3.1. Abort Environments
Reentry of the radioisotope thermionic power system (RTPS) occurs only
in the event of failure of the launch vehicle to place the payload in an
escape trajectory. Thus, all possible abort conditions had to be considered.
The most likely abort cases cause the RTPS to reenter as a free body.
The most severe reentry cases are: (1) steep reentry (-90° flight
path angle) at escape velocity which resulted in the highest heating rates
and external surface temperatures,and (2) orbital decay reentry with its
attendent long heating pulse which resulted in the highest internal structural
temperatures.
5.3.2. Safety Requirements
There are two safety requirements which must be met during reentry.
First, protection will be provided so that, under the worst possible reentry
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conditions, the radioisotopic fuel is not released. Second, protection will
be provided for the safety system so that it is still operable at impact.
5.3.3. Design Criteria
An aerodynamically oriented reentry configuration is necessary to cause
the vehicle to impact on the energy absorbing nose. An oriented configuration
also minimizes reentry protection requirements since the most severe heating
is generally localized over the small nose region.
Oriented reentry was provided by a flare located just aft of the active
radiator area. In addition to providing aerodynamic stability, the flare
also reduces the ballistic coefficient and, thus, reduces reentry heating.
Therefore, the flare was sized to provide the maximum drag for the minimum
weight.
5.3.4. Reentry Heating
Transient aerodYnamic heating (and radiative heating at the stagnation
point) was calculated for four locations on the reentry vehicle for escape
velocity reentry varying in flight path angle from -10 to -90 degrees and for
orbital decay reentry. The worst a~rodYnamic heating occurs during the -900
reentry on the flare due to turbulent flow conditions and results in a maximum
heat flux of 2.8(10)7 W/m2 . The worst total heating occurs during orbital
decay reentry at the stagnation point and results in a total heat load of
6200 B/ft2 . Radiative heating from the shock layer to the stagnation point is
only important at reentry angles greater than -500 •
5.3.5. Thermal Protection System
A carbon/graphite fibrous composite, Pyro-Carb 406, was selected for the
ablative heat shield. This is the same material used on the SNAP 27 fuel
capsule which also had to survive reentry at escape velocity. It affords
excellent ablation characteristics common to graphit ic materials and yet has a
relatively low thermal conductivity in the radial direction.
Ablation calculations were done for the stagnation point to establish
the necessary thickness of Pyro-Carb. The worst ablation occurs during re-
entry at _100 at escape veloc ity due to the relatively long heat pulse and
high surface temperatures. Total recession under these conditions is 3.64 cm.
A layer of zirconia felt backs up the Pyro-Carb 406 and insulates the
underlying structure on the nose and flare, and structure-safety system on the
cylindrical body. Thermal conductivity of the felt was allowed to vary with
temperature and ambient pressure. The resulting structural temperatures are
sufficiently low to allow use of stainless steel.
5.4. IMPACT ON WATER
The most likely abort impact mode is immersion in sea water. Provis ions
have been incorporated in the design of the RI'PS for water flotation and
recovery. In the event that the system sinks or is in the water for extended
durations, sea water and electrolytic corros ion of the capsules must be con-
sidered. However, tungsten has excellent sea water corrosion resist'ar~ce,with
less than 8 microns per year surface recession rate expected.
Because of the small diameter of the curium capsules, they are capable
of withstanding large external pressures; hence, there is little chance of
rupture or buckling due to water submergence. Thermal shock of the capsules
is also a consideration; however, the temperature of the capsules will probably
be less than 8000 K upon impact due to aerodynamic cooling of the auxiliary
radiator prior to impact. Additionally, the RTPS structure is sufficiently
sealed to prevent rapid sinking and cooling.
In the event that the curium fuel is exposed to sea water, as a worst-
case assumption, dissolution of the fuel would occur but at an extremely
slow rate as shown by the following data.
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Cm203: Solubility and leach rates of 244Cffi203
Ref: ORNL 4663 (Quarterly Report, Dec. 31, 1970)
Cumulative fraction of Curium dissolved
Time 1.4 gm pellet 0.1 gm powder (noncharacterized
116 hr distilled H2O 2.6 x 10-
5 1.5 x 10-3 i.e., mesh size)
116 hr 2·3
. -6 8.4 x 10-5sea H2O x 10
5.5. LAND IMPACT
The safety package is designed to survive terminal velocity impact onto
a hard unyielding surface by a combination of energy absorption honeycomb and
structural support of the heat source within the safety package. Various
energy absorption and aerodynamic drag augmentation systems were considered
and are discussed in Section 6.4. Parachutes and ballutes were omitted in
favor of a passive flare retardation device. Calculated terminal velocity
for the 244 em diameter flare is 45 m/sec.
Computations were performed for soil burial and it was determined that
unless the system impacts into a moist or highly plastic soil, earth penetra-
tion depth will not cause burial.
Because of the good dynamic and static stability characteristics of the
aerodynamic flare, land impact should occur nose-on at 45 m/sec. The honey-
comb energy absorption system (Section 6.4) is designed to absorb 100% of
the kinetic eriergy occurring from these conditions. Although impact at high
angles of attack cannot be precluded, it was determined that rotation of the
system due to wind and gust velocities of 9 m/sec will be less than 1° .
Temperatures of the RTPS on the ground will be "-' 9000K, assuming radiatjve
heat transfer only. In case half the auxiliary radiator is buried due to sand
coverRge or damage to the radiator, the radiator temperature will rise to 11600K
which will result in melting of the LiH shield.
5 .6 . LOCATION AND RECOVERY AIDS
Recovery aids are incorporated in the safety package for locating
the RTPS following an accidental abort impact onto land or water. In
addit ion to trajectory and tracking data on the spacecraft, a number of
techniques and devices will be employed to aid in ra~id location of the
power supply. These include: (1) radio beacons such as the SARAH system
(Search and Rescue and Homing), (2) radar chaff and reflective coatings
on the flare base and blast shield,(3) sound fixing and ranging (SOFAR)
devices, (4) sea water dye markers, (5) flashing lights, and (6) underwater
pingers, and (7) flotation devices.
Dr. Stulken, NASA Landing and Recovery Operations, estimates that
with a reliable beacon, and possibly using IR sensing devices, a search team
of four aircraft could locate an aborted system within 24 hours. Actual
recovery could be accomplished by a parachute team such as the D. S. Air
Force's ARRS (Aerospace Rescue and Recovery System). The search and re-
covery team for an Apollo launch abort (Ref. 19) consists of three aircraft
which can locate the command module within three hours, presuming the impact
corridor is known to within 100 miles from launch and trajectory data.
For land impact, the preferred approach is to use a radio beacon in
conjunction with IR sensing equipment (such as the Firescan System used by
the Do S. Forest Service) for location. Special shock mounting provisions
will be required and use of special antennas, such as streaming antennas
will be required since vehicle orientation on the ground cannot be assured.
Flotat ion devices are required for water impact recovery, since the
RTPS System will not float in its present configuration. For submersion
depths greater than 60 meters immediate recovery would be more difficult
and would require use of sonar and special deep-sea vehicles. Goodyear
ballutes are commonly used for recovery operations, such as retrieval of
the cassette cameras on launch vehicles, and their weight, storage require-
ments, and reliability are known.
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Table 5.6 summarizes the location aids considered for the Radioisotope
Brayton IRV System and compares masses with those obtained from U. S. Air
Force programs. The electronic recovery aids used on the TRANSIT Space-
craft for ocean recovery include a 1 kg underwater acoustic beacon, Model
N15A217A, manufactured by Dukane Corporation. This system may also be
adequate for the RTPS and results in a much lower mass penalty than the
Air Force electronic aids.
TABLE 5·6
LOCATION AND RECOVERY AID DESIGN" CHARACTERISTICS
Limiting Storage
Component Mass (kg) Volume (cc) Temperature
Radio beacon 0.6 246 > 100°C
Flashing light 0·3 164 > 100°C
Dye marker 0·9 262 > 100°C
Battery & cables 6·3 3360 80 - 100°C
(NiCad type)
Flotation bag (A.F.) 6.5
Electronic recovery 22.1 (Optional requirement)
aids (A.F.) 36.7
6. SAFETY DESIGN ANALYSES
Safety design analyses in support of portions of the safety system which
were revised during this study are reported in this section. These include the
launch pad fire protection system, blast shielding, reentry and impact pro-
tection and radiation shielding. Design analyses in support of other portions, -
of the system, which have not changed significantly during this study, are
contained in Ref. 1 •
6.1. L.AlJNCH PAD FIRE ANALYSIS
An alternative to the launch escape rocket system of the Phase I refer-
ence design (Ref. 1) is a modified safety package which can survive a launch
pad abort environment. The thermal environment represents the greatest
hazard to the survival of the fuel containment system. To aid in the design
and analysis of thermal protection concepts, a simplified thermal-model was
developed for evaluating the transient response of the system when exposed
to the worst-case solid propellant fire environment of 26000 K for 10 minutes.
The following sections discuss the model and the design technique used to
satisfY the requirement and alternative concepts considered.
6.1.1. Transient Thermal AnaJ.ysis Model
The TAC2D code (Ref. 20) developed by Gulf General Atomic was used for
the launch pad thermal analysis. This code calculates steady-state and
transient temperatures in two-dimensional problems by the finite difference
method. The configuration of the body to be analyzed is described in the
rectangular, cylindrical or circular (polar) coordinate system by orthogonal
lines of constant coordinate called grid lines. The grid lines specifY an
array of nodal elements. Nodal points are defined as lying midway between
the bounding grid lines of these elements. A finite difference equation is
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formulated for each nodal point in terms of its capacitance, heat generation
and heat flow paths to neighboring nodal points.
Figure 6.1 shows the model geometry in cylindrical coordinates for the
reference design radioisotope system. Each of the major components has been
approximated by a rectangular cross-sectional segment defined by the heavier
boundary lines. The aerodynamic flare and honeycomb nose material have been
neglected for simplicity because they should not have a significant effect on
the launch pad thermal response. The block nodes outside the heat pipes were
varied according to the specific fire shield design being analyzed.
Table 6.1 gives a detailed summary of the materials, block dimensions
and physical properties. For the heat pipes, the thermal conductivity was
approximated assuming a 10°C ~T drop between the average heat source and radi-
ator temperatures. Thermal k and specific heat values for the heat source and
thermionic cells were estimated by ratioing properties of the various materials
by their volume fraction and assuming a homogeneous distribution of material
in the block. Water coolant was used initially and later changed to helium
when it was determined that helium could provide adequate heat removal prior
to launch. Helium cooling has the advantage of minimizing thermal gradients
and thermal cycling of the auxiliary heat pipes.
6.1.2. LiH!Zirconia Heat Storage - Insulator Fire Shield
Protection of the RTPS Safety System from a launch abort fire could be
provided simply by wrapping an insulator such as Min-k or zirconia, around the
outside of the system. However, unless active devices are employed to remove the
insulation immediately after launch, or after a fire, the auxiliary heat pipes
could not reject the internal heat without exceeding design operating limits.
Based on thermal analyses of various fire shield designs, it was con-
cluded that a configuration which jUdiciously utilized a heat storage material
and an insulator would result in fire shield design with acceptable mass and
overall thermal conductance. Because of its favorable heat capacity, melting
point, and neutron shielding properties lithium hydride was selected as the
heat storage material. The LiH fire shield surrounds the auxiliary radiator
and is in turn surrounded with a layer of high temperature insulation, such
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TABLE 6.1
LAUNCH PAD ABORT TRANSIENT THERMAL ANALYS IS MODEL PAMMETERS
NODE GEOMETRY f VOLUMETRIC
OUTSIDE INSIDE SPECIFIC
BLOCIt COMPONENT MATERIAL RADIUS RADIUS HEIGHT VOLIf.IE CONDUCTIVITY HEAT
(cm) (em) (cm) (m ) (Btu/~r ft OF) * (Btu/Ft3 OF)
1 Radiator Void Nitrogen 25.0 0 20.0 .0393 3.7(10)-3 + 2.1(10)-5D~ 0.30
2 Aux. Radiator Stainless 25.17 25.0 102.24 .00274 1.12(10)6 157.6
Hest Pipes Steel
3, 17 External Thermal 25.17 125.0 Fire Environment 106
Environment Dummy
5.27 - 1.84(10)-3DR** .. ~+4 Safety Shield LiH 25.0 14.15 82.24 .1097 26.7 + .03601.
5 Internal Stainless 14.0 14.15 20.49 .00027 12.0 58.7
Structure Steel
6 Neutron Shield Beryllium 14.0 0 20.0 .0123 35.0 8.8
Thermionic Cells Tungsten + 14.0 0 10.0 .00616 9.8 (est.) 25.5 (est. )
S.S. + Void
8 tt Hea t Source WRe+emO + 14.0 7.38 36.0 .0160 26.3 (est.) 10.8 (est. )
S.S. + V~i~
9 Aux. Radiator Stainless 7.38 7.0 20.49 .00035 1.12 (10)6 58.7
Heat Pipe Steel
10 tt Heat Source Same as Node 8 7.0 0 36.0 .00554 26.3 10.8
11 Water Coolant Water So Vapor 14.0 7.38 16.24 .00722 0.35 (+)DR**.... 1.0(+)DR**
+ O.013(+)DR + 0.44(+)DII.
12 Water Coolant Water So Vapor 7.0 0 17.0 .00262 Same 11 Same 11
13 Aux. Radiator Stainless 25.17 7.0 0.76 .0014 1.12(10)6 58.7
Hest Pipe Steel
14 Water Coolant Ws ter So Vapor 25.17 0 7.0 .0139 Same 11 Same 11
15 Top Safety LiH 25.17 0 10.0 .0199 Same 4 Same 4Shield
16 Top Structure Stainless 25.17 0 0.31 .00062 12.0 58.7
Steel
18, 19 External Fire 30 0 125 High High
Coolant Environment
20, 21 Internal Adisbatic 30 0 125 Low Low
Coolants Boundaries
Boundary dimensions for cylindrical coordinate model.
Engineering units used in TAC2D (Thermal Analysis Code using the finite
difference method).
** DR is the node temperature in OR.
tt Volumetric heating rate = 2.224(10)5 Btu/hr ft 3
***(+)DR = (1 - DR/1540) and (+)DRl = DR/1540
+T+ 0 0 /1?p given for 0 to 1727 R. At 1727 R, the heat of fusion of 1120 Btu b
1S applied and above 1727°R Cp = 93 Btu/ft3 OF
~OTE: British units used for consistency with computer program for ther~al
analysis - 1 Btu/hr ft OF = 1.73 W/m OK; 1 Btu/ft3 OF = 6.71 x 104
J/m3 OK; lOR = 5/9 OK
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as zirconia felt, which lowers the heat flux into the LiH from a fire. The
mass of LiH required depends on its heat capacity (sensible heat plus latent
heat) and the thickness of insulation for a specified tire environment. From
the best available data on LiH, the sensible heat was taken at 1600 Btu/lb
(3.7 x 106 J /kg), and the latent heat at 1200 Btu/lb (2.8 x 106 J /kg) .
Figure 6.2 shows tradeoff curves of LiH and insulation mass with LiH
thickness for various values of thermal insulation conductivity. These curves
assume that the LiH absorbs all of the fire heat conducted through the insu-
lation by changing from a solid at ambient temperature to a liquid at the
boiling point for LiH of 1267°F (9600 K). Increasing the LiH thickness dimin-
ishes the thickness of insulation required according to the relationship (for
a ten minute 2600° K fire):
t L' H = 0.594 k. lit. 1~ ~nsu ~nsu
where t = thickness in inches, and
k = insulation conductivity in Btu/hr ftOF.
It can be observed from the lower curves in Fig. 6.2 that there is a
minimum shield mass for a specific insulation conductivity and LiH thickness.
However, to eliminate the requirement of having to remove the shield immedi-
ately after the fire, the conductivity of the fire shield should be high
enough in the equilibrium case (i.e., radiation of the internal heat to ambient
conditions) to limit the operating temperature of the auxiliary heat pipes to
approximately 12000 K (Section 6.1.4). Consequently, since the equilibrium
radiator temperature is -9000 K, the allowable ~T across the insulation is
- 3000C. To illustrate how the fire shields meet this criteria, the upper
curves in Fig. 6.2 give the variation in ~T across the fire shield for differ-
ent LiH conductivities. These curves show that for the conditions assumed
(i.e., all the fire heat to be absorbed by the LiH) the desired equilibrium
~T can be achieved only by increasing the LiH conductivity. However, as dis-
cussed below, this shield design can meet the desired design conditions when
the thermal capacitance of the entire system is considered.
The transient thermal response of the heat pipes during and following a
launch pad fire was evaluated for various insulation thicknesses, using the
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detailed thermal model developed for the system. Results of these analyses
are summarized in Table 6.2; and temperatures for insulation thicknesses of
0.12 and 0.048-inch are plotted in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. The table results
for the detailed thermal model show that the heat pipe temperature will be
below 12000 K for insulation thickness to °.048-inch, and that the equilibrium
temperature at 105 seconds (28 hours) for O.12-inch insulation, is below
1200o K.* However, Fig. 6.4 shows that for the thinner insulation section the
peak temperature occurs at about 700 seconds and exceeds 1250o K. The table
also shows that using N2 in place of the water coolant, and modifying the
LiH conductivity has little effect on the heat pipe thermal response. Veri-
fication of these results was obtained using a simplified lumped thermal
model which included a 0.15 cm stainless steel structure around the LiH.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present computer printout results of the system tem-
Ii'
peratures at the end of the launch fire (10 minutes) and after 10,000 seconds
(2.7 hr), which represents the length of time that may be required to recover
the system after a launch pad abort. The initial conditions for these analyses
assumed the fuel at 533°K (500°F) and the system at 3110 K (100°F). From Table
6.3, it can be observed that most of the temperature drop between the fuel
and fire occurs across the zirconia insulation, and that the heat pipe tempera-
ture is in a safe operating region and closely follows that of the LiH sur-
rounding the heat pipes, which is 1.9 cm thick. The heat capacity of the inner
10 cm thick LiH biological shield is sufficiently large so that its temperature
does not exceed the melting point of LiH (1267°F, 9600 K) 2.8 hours after a
launch abort fire, as observed in Table 6.4. This table also shows the tem-
perature drop across the fire shield to transfer the internal heat to the
.
atmosphere, assuming radiation and convection to 140°F (3300 K) air. Other
temperatures of interest include those of the stainless steel tanks which
contain the LiH radiation shield. These were also found to be in a safe
operating region except for the nose surface temperatures (line 16, Table 6.3),
which would also be below 12000 K if the reentry protection insulation were
taken into account in the thermal model.
*Actual equilibrium temperatures are below thrne shown in Table 6.2 due to
the lower heat input (44.2 kW) compared to that used for this analysis
(51. 75 k\v).
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Based on the transient thermal analysis results, the recommended in-
sulation thickness is O.12-inch (0.31 cm) which corresponds to an insulation
conductance of 2.5 Btu/hr :f't of (in.) or 0.017 watts/cm2 oK. Table 6.5 sum-
marizes the design characteristics for the launch abort fire shield based on
this insulation conductivity and the LiH thickness for minimum mass. A
conductivity of 0.3 Btu/hr :f't of was assumed for zirconia; and although this
is a representative value for the foam, it is somewhat greater than supplier
data on the felt material. Further optimization of the fire shield would
require instrumented thermal tests which would better simulate the insula-
tion thermal response and the effects of interface thermal impedance.
TABLE 6.5
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REVISED LiH/ZIRCONIA LAUNCH
PAD ABORT FIRE SHIELD (26000 K FIRE, 10 MINUTES)
LiH thickness
Stainless steel structure thickness
Zirconia thickness
Shield length
LiH density
Stainless steel density
Zirconia density
LiH mass
Stainless steel mass
Zirconia mass
Total shield mass
71
1.9 cm (0.75 in.)
0.152 cm (0.06 in.)
0.31 cm (0.12 in.)
142 cm (361 in.)
0.75 gm/cc
8.0 gm/cc
0.9 gm/cc
32.6 kg
28.4 kg
6.5 kg
67.5 kg
6.1.3. Alternate Fire Protection Concepts
Various design concepts for protecting the auxiliary radiator and safety
package from damage caused by a launch pad fire were considered and analysed.
These are discussed briefly in the following subsections.
6.1.3.1. Heat Storage Materials. Protection of the radioisotope safety system
with heat storage material represents a brute force method to ensure fire sur-
vival, and one that will not result in overheating during a land impact abort
situation. However, the masses of the seven different candidate materials
were found to be immense when designed for maximum fire temperatures and
durations. For illustration, Table 6.6 presents characteristics of candidate
heat shield materials which have melting points near or below the heat pipe
temperature limit of 1200o K. Some of the lower melting point materials, such
as lead and tin, are included only for comparison since their mass is pro-
hibitive. The computed thermal shield parameters are based upon the assump-
tion that all of the fire heat input must be absorbed by a phase change of
the heat shield. The results show that the shield mass is high for all the
materials relative to the total mass for the reference design of 739.5 kg.
LiH gives the lowest mass, followed by aluminum and magnesium. However,
because of the low thermal conductivity of LiH, the eqUilibrium ~T is exces-
sively large unless techniques are used to shunt heat through the shield.
A lighter weight shield may also be obtained by using the fire heat to
vaporize the shield material. Magnesium, for example, has a boiling tempera-
ture of l3900 K and a heat of vaporization of 5.31(10)6 joules/kg. Thus a
shield mass of 377 kg or less could absorb the total fire input energy.
Problems are encountered, however, when considering how to contain the molten
material and vent the vapor without the liquid material flowing out the
vent. The selection of materials is also limited, since most elements have
high boiling points ..
Another consideration is the effect of shorter postulated fire durations
on heat storage shield requirements. Mass is proportioned to fire time, so
that a LiH shield of 90 kg and 6.5-cm thickness would provide protection for
72
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a one-minute 2600 K fire. The equilibrium temperature drop across the shield,
however, is less sensitive to time and would be approximately 460o K, which
is excessively high. Corresponding aluminum shield mass would be 586 kg,
which is also prohibitively high.
6.1.3.2. Thermal Switch Composite Materials. Thermal switch composites are
metal-impregnated porous ceramics capable of switching their thermal con-
ductivity from high values at low temperatures to low values at elevated
temperatures, such as encountered during reentry and a launch pad fire.
Numerous combinations of composite materials have been tested and developed,
inclUding silver-impregnated silica, silver/alumina, silver/zirconia, copper/
Zirconia, nickel/zirconia and palladium/zirconia (Refs. 21, 22). The mechanism
for switching the thermal conductivity of these materials involves the change
of a uniform thin metallic coating deposited on the surface of the porous
ceramic to discontinous spherical droplets as the metal melts and de-wets the
ceramic surface.
Of the various composites considered, silver/zirconia felt has the most
desirable characteristics for a fire thermal protection system. Silver
melts at 1234°K (17600 F) and zirconia has been tested to 2800o K. The
Zirconia-felt has a lower density and conductivity than zirconia-foam, and
can be produced to a higher quality material. Thermal conductivity of the
composite is proportional to the volume of metal added to the ceramic, where
_ 10% is considered a practical limit. Since the density for silver is
10.5 gm/cc, compared to ~ 0.9 gm/cc to certain types of zirconia-felt,
approximately 1 gm/cc of silver could be impregnated into the ceramic.
Assuming that the conductivity of the composite is proportional to the volume
of silver, a theoretical value of 21 Btu/hr ftOF (0.36 watt/cmoC) could be
obtained.
Results of transient thermal response of the system using a thermal
switch fire shield are shown in Figure 6.5. The computed temperatures indi-
cate that the outer layer rapidly increases in temperature until the metal
melts, thus halting the temperature rise until the heat source internal
heat generation begins to take over. For this thickness of material, the
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safety system could withstand a severe solid propellant fire for up to two
hours.
Transient thermal cases were repeated for shield thicknesses down to
1.5 em. These thinner sections were also found to give good fire protec-
tion. Characteristics of a preliminary thermal-switch-shield design for
fire protection are given in Table 6.7. This shield thickness will provide
protection against the most severe solid propellant fire for up to 2 hours.
After this time it will be necessary to remove the shield or provide some
special means of cooling the system to prevent meltdown. Since active
control systems or rapid location of the system after a fire would be
required to accomplish this, the concept is considered less desirable than
the insulation/heat storage design.
6.1.3.3. Thermal Expansion Radiation Shields. Another potential concept
for protecting the safety system during a launch pad fire is to surround the
auxiliary radiator with concentric radiation shields. These shields could
be sized to provide an interference, low thermal resistance fit during
radiation to ambient conditions, and to separate when exposed to a fire due
to differential thermal expansion between the cooler inner shields and the
hotter outer layers. Such shields would need to have a relatively high
coefficient of thermal expansion, low conductiVity to minimize contact
resistances, low emissivity and high temperature capabilities.
The performance of an ideal radiation shield system can be evaluated
considering only radiant heat exhange, where the following expression relates
the number of shields and heat transfer:
radiant heat flow through the shields,
= areas of the shield next to the fire and radiator,
radiant interchange factor = 8 /2-8 for shields of equal
s s
area and emissivity (8 ),
S
= number of radiation shields, and
= Stefan-Boltzmann constant.
~=
A
F
n
(J
where,
76
TABLE 6.7 .
PRELIMINARY DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF A THERMAL SWITCH
COMPOSITE SHIELD FOR LAUNCH DAY FIRE PROTECTION
Material
Switching Temperature
Thermal Conductivity
before Switching
Thermal Conductivity
after Switching
Reference Thickness
Shield Volume
Shield Mass
Heat Pipe Temperature
(2600 K Fire)
Outer half of Heat Shield
(2600 K Fire)
Temperature drop across the
Shield before Switching
77
Silver impregnated Zirconia Felt
1234°K (1762oF)
0.173 watts/cmoC
1.52 em
30,000 cm3
56.4 kg
8300 K (at t = 1000 Sec)'
1160°K (at t = 5000 Sec)
15500 K (at t = 5000 Sec)
27°K (Radiation to atmosphere)
In addition to radiant heat, conducted heat through the gas between
shields and contact resistance between adjacent shields must also be con-
sidered. To evaluate the transient thermal behavior of such shields, the
system thermal model was modified to include five stainless steel radiation
shields, of 0.15 em thickness each, around the auxiliary radiator. The
shields were thermally coupled by a radiation gap filled with a gas of
variable conductivity to simulate different gap thicknesses, contact resis-
tance or gas pressures. Figure 6.6 shows transient temperature profiles
for cases which attempt to bracket the probable shield gap, conducted heat
flow and emissivity, when exposed to a 30000F (19000K) launch pad fire.
All cases exceed the allowable heat pipe temperature limit in less than 500
seconds. The corresponding response for a 26000K fire was much less, exceeding
the radiator temperature limit in approximately 140 seconds. These rapid
response trends indicate that this shield concept does not provide the nec-
essary thermal protection to assure system survival in a launch pad fire.
Furthermore, this shield concept is subject to numerous practical design
uncertainties, such as assuring concentricity, integrity after impact,
separation of shields, and others.
6.1.4. Auxiliary Radiator Heat Pipes
Protection of the radioisotope heat source during and after a launch
pad fire will depend on the ability of the potassium filled auxiliary heat
pipes to function. Because of the increase in potassium vapor pressure with
temperature, and corresponding decrease in heat pipe strength, it will be
necessary to limit the temperature rise. For a conservative approximation,
this temperature limit was selected as that which would cause rupture of the
heat pipe tubes in 1000 hours. Figure 6.7 shows potassium vapor pressure,
heat-pipe hoop stress and 1000-hour rupture stress of various high tempera-
ture, oxidation resistant alloys. The tube rupture stress is based on an
outside diameter of 0.73 em and inside diameter of 0.71. Material proper-
ties were obtained from Ref. 23 and supplier data brochures.
For the reference design stainless steel radiator heat pipes to survive,
they must operate below 12000K (17000F). This limit can be raised to 12500K
78
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with Haynes 25 tubes and 13600 K with T.D. nickel. Another alternative for
higher temperatures is to increase the heat pipe wall thickness or ,ch~ge
the working fluid to sodium. Effects of these alternatives on heat pipe
operating temperature are shown in Figure 6.8. The curves show that to
achieve a 1000 K increase in temperature, the thickness would increase from
0.01 em to 0.06 em using K, or to 0.03 em using Na. Since the present mass
of the heat pipes is 10.5 kg, increasing the wall thickness may increase
the mass 50 kg. Use of sodium in place of potassium results in only a 400 K
improvement. Both of these options represent possible alternatives to the
Safety System design capability.
6.2. BLAST'SHIELDnm
A shield is required to protect the radioisotope heat source auxiliary
radiator, aerodynamic flare, and other safety e'luipment from damage caused
by schrapne1 and the overpressure environment accompanying a booster explo-
sion. Blast environments from the reference Titan IIID/Centaur vehicle
were discussed in Section 5.2. Due to the inade'luacy of fragment shield
analytical models, the approach generally taken is to test the heat source
or shield by impacting it with projectiles which simulate the expected worst-
case environment, such as shown in Table 5.5 for Pioneer.
A comparison of blast shield designs was made based on heat source
materials and thicknesses, which have been subjected to some form of fragment
or meteoroidal design analysis testing. Table 6.8 summarizes the various
systems and graphically compares the computed mass of a circular shield of
120 cm diameter, which corresponds to the flare diameter of the reference
design safety system of Phase I (Ref. 1 ), and is sufficient for shadow
shielding of the auxiliary radiator. Because of its toughness, high
strength-to-weight ratio and temperature capabilities, titanium is considered
to be an excellent choice for a fragment shield. This material was specifi-
cally selected for the Apollo isotope heaters (15 watt units), and successfully
withstood some 55 safety tests which included exposure to aluminum tank
fragments at 2800 fps. T-lll also seems to be a possible choice based on
safety tests on the TRANSIT capsule with 41 gm Ti fragments impacted at
~26 mps, a 1.6 kg electronic box impacted at 95 mp? and an 0.4 kg igniter
at 363 mps.
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The selected blast shield design for the radioisotope safety package
is a cylindrical disc of titanium 0.64 cm thick which covers the flight
system diameter and an annular shield of 0.13 cm which covers the aerodynamic
flare. The annular shield will have a mass of 25.8 kg (neglecting structural
mechanisms) and is jettisoned with the other safety equipment. The thicker
50.3 cm diameter section in the center has a 5.9 kg mass and will become a perma-
nent part of the flight system.
It is important to note that intervening structure will also provide
blast shielding. Hence, the preferred approach in designing for a blast
environment is to interpose other mass between the critical components and
explosive source. However, in the present case the blast shield mass is not
excessive relative to the overall safety system mass of 450 kg, and improves
integration flexibility.
In addition to withstanding fragment impact, the blast shield will also
be subjected to an overpressure pulse. This pressure is maximum during a
launch pad explosion and decreases at higher altitudes. The computed stress
in a solid disc of 60 em radius subjected to a peak overpressure of 150 psi
is sufficient to cause rupture. Consequently, the shield will require struc-
tural stiffening to survive the overpre ssure enviromnent. S+iffening of
the shield is also required to withstand the stresses generated by fragment
impact.
6·3· REENTRY DESIGN ANALYSIS
The RTPS is designed to assUre intact-reentry from all possible abort
modes. Protect ion from reentry heating was established by analyses of vehicle
aeroballistics and the resulting aerothermodynamics.
6.3.1. Aeroballistics
6.3.1.1. Abort Configurations. Four likely abort configurations were studied
to determine their reentry aeroballistic characteristics. These are shown in
Fig. 6.9. The arrangement of the RTPS relative to the payload is typical; the
84
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Fig. 6.9. Probable abort configurations
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actual case may be somewhat more compact but will not affect the results.
Three of these are malfunctions occurring near the time of Centaur ignition
when suborbital conditions still exist. In the first case, a failure of the
Centaur to initiate its chill-down sequence prior to ignition is assumed,
resulting in the radioisotope thermionic power supply (RTPS), payload and
fueled Centaur assembly reentering. In the second case, it is assumed that
the chill-down sequence occurs on the Centaur; however, ignition does not
occur and the propellants are drained leaving the same assembly as Case 1,
but much lighter. The assumption in the third case is that separation of
the payload from the Centaur occurs prior to Centaur ignition and the assembly
of the payload and RTPS reenters. The final case is the RTPS reentering from
earth orbit as a freebody.
For each configuration, the center of mass (c.g.) was determined
assuming that the payload c.g. is a third of the axial length above the
mounting interface. The preferred reentry attitude was determined by recalcu-
lating the center of pressure (c.p.) assuming a side-on attitude and Newtonian
flow. For this calculation, the payload was approximated as a solid cylinder
having a CD = 1.2. Typical electric propulsion payloads have a density of
32 kg/m3 (2 Ib/ft3) which would fill the available envelope space. The
stability in the side-on attitude is shown in Table 6.9 expressed as Xc/p./
Xc.g. Both Case 1 and 2 will reenter with the Centaur engines forward. Case
3 will tumble and the RTPS as a freebody would be nose first stable.
The hypersonic ballistic coefficients were calculated for these con-
figurations in their entry attitude based on Newtonian flow. Engine hardware
would receive severe heating in Case 1 and 2, however, should remain stable
to an altitude well below that of peak heating. Tumbling ballistic coefficient
for Case 3 was determined by the integrated average for one revolution.
The range of these possible abort conditions were evaluated to assess
the likelihood of occurrence. Both conditions 1 and 2 would be readily ob-
served by the launch crew and a command destruct would be initiated. As a
result, the Centaur stage would be stripped away leaving the configuration
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of either condition 3 or 4. (This assumes that simultaneous failures in sepa-
rate systems don't occur; e.g., the command destruct system is functional.)
Condition 3 is less likely than condition 4, normal reentry, yet results
in the worst sidewall heating due to the tumbling reentry attitude. For reentry
at orbital and escape velocities, heating at high altitudes will cause burnup of
the payload and, thus, the configuration 4 would result. Therefore, condition 3
was considered only for pre-orbital abort. Condition 4 was considered for the
entire range of reentry possibilities: pre-orbital, orbital and at escape velo-
city.
The range of heating that can result from these conditions is discussed in
Section 6.3.2. The worst case for interior temperatures is the orbital decay
while high-angle reentry at escape velocity is worst for heating rates.
6.3.1.2. Aerodynamic Design. Aerodynamic behavior of the RTPS reentry con-
figuration is primarily a function of the flare design, i.e., conic half-angle
and base diameter. The smallest and lightest flare is one which has the largest
half-angle for the maximum drag. Figure 6.10 gives the variation of hypersonic
drag coefficient with flare angle measured on a model having nearly the same LID
as the RTPS. The maximum drag coefficient occurs at about a 45° half-angle which
was chosen as the reference design.
o
,
o Measured values
spherical nosed body
----Calculated with pressure
based on local flow con-
ditions at the separation
point
....---.--r--"'T"""'-~----,r---"T'":::::=.6f deg.
60 75 90
1.0
M 8.75
0·5 00 6Re = 0.23 x 10D
0
0 15 30 45
1.5
Fig. 6.10. Drag coefficient vs flare angle
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The influence of variations in the diameter of the 45° half-angle flare
on the RTPS aeroballistics was evaluated. Volume within the payload envelope
allows for a substantial increase in the flare diameter above the 122 cm
diameter baseline design. Benefits of a larger flare (shown in Fig. 6.11)
are to reduce the ballistic coefficient of the configuration. These calcu-
lations assumed the unit weight of the flare is 8 kg/m2 • These results are
based on a drag coefficient computed from the following relationship:
CDN ~ + CDF (SINcp) A.F
AB
where,
= drag coefficient for the nose, which was taken as that for a
sphere (1.0 for hypersonic conditions and 0.47 for subsonic
condit ions*) ,
~ = projected or cross-sectional area of the nose (cylindrical section),
CDF = drag coefficient for the flare, which was taken as that for aflat plate (1.69 for hypersonic conditions and 1.18 for subsonic
conditions, Ref. 24) and multiplied by the SIN of the flare angle,
A.F = projected area of the conical flare,
cp flare angle taken as 45° ,
AB = projected area of the flare base.
The design point diameter shown in Fig. 6.11 was selected since it
results in ballistic coefficient.s below the knee of the curve and does not
cause excessive weight.
The LiH radiation shield (discussed in Section 6.5) influences the
aeroballistics because of added system mass and an increase in diameter of
the cylindrical body. Figure 6.12 shows the effect of a safety system mass
and diameter increase on subsonic and hypersonic drag coefficients for the
case of constant flare diameter. The figure also shows the combined effect of
*This is approximately 25% lower than experimental results obtained on a
similar geometry during Gun Tunnel Tests which were referenced in the last
monthly report.
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Fig. 6.12. Drag coefficient and heating rate changes with increases
in safety system mass and diameter
CD and ballistic coefficient changes on stagnation point aerodynamic heating
during reentry, based on the following proportionality:
aerodynamic heating rate
hypersonic ballistic coefficient (W/CnA) and
diameter of the nose (or cylindrical structure).
Since the peak reentry heating varies with the square root of the hyper-
sonic ballistic coefficient, a doubling of the diameter will reduce heat ing by
nearly 50 percent. A similar reduction in the terminal velocity also results
since it varies as the square root of the subsonic ballistic coefficient.
6.3.1.3. Reentry Trajectories. Overall dimensions of the reentry vehicle
which provides safe, intact protection of the RTPS is shown in Fig. 6.13. The
resulting reference design vehicle has a mass of 475 kg and a hypersonic bal-
listic coefficient of 85.5 kg/m2 . A range of reentry trajectories were investi-
gated for this design. Reentry trajectories for the reference mission were
supplied by the NASA/OART Mission Analysis Division. These were based on a
hypersonic drag coefficient of 1.2 and were calculated for a 900 launch
azimuth and initial flight path angles from _100 to -900 with an initial velo-
city of 11 km/sec. Reentry from a low earth orbit was also considered.
Figure 6.14 shows the superorbital reentry profiles. This range of traject-
ories covers all possible abort modes.
A second set of trajectory cases was studied for a reentry vehicle of
the same configuration but having a 200 kg mass increase. The resulting hyper-
sonic ballistic coefficient for this heavier vehicle is 122 kg/m2 ; however, it
eould be lowered to the original value by increasing the flare diameter to less
than 3 meters.
6.3.2. Aerothermodynamics
6.3.2.1. Aerodynamic Heating. Calculations of aerodynamic heating to the
sphere-cylinder-flare reentry configuration was accomplished simultaneously
93
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with calculation of structural temperatures using a generalized computer
program (Ref. 26). In this program aerodynamic heating is calculated by
means of the "reference enthalpy method" of Eckert and others. The refer-
ence enthalpy method is generally advantageous in that aerodynamic heating
rates can be accurately predicted over a broad range of flight conditions.
This holds true for many cases in which high-temperature gaseous dissociation
and ionization occur in the boundary layer. By evaluating the properties of
air at a "reference enthalpy" defined as
EN* = ENf + 0.5 (ENW - ENf ) + 0.22 (ENr - ENf )
where: EN* = reference enthalpy
ENf = local flow enthalpy
ENW wall enthalpy
EN = recovery enthalpy
r
it is possible to employ incompressible flow relationships in formulating
heat transfer coefficients. Heat transfer is calculated for geometries ap-
proximating flat plates, wedges, cones, spheres, or cylinders. All flight
velocities can be accommodated for any altitude at which the atmosphere can
be considered a continuum.
Heat transfer to the stagnation point of a sphere is calculated by the
methods of Refs. 27 and 28 and incorporates a modified Detra-Kemp-Riddell
expression:
-6 (-bj'5 (U ) 3·15 (EN t - EN.Qi = 1.9 x 10 100t, <1 ENt - ENooco
where: Qi = heat flux, B/ft
2hr
poo = freestream density, 1b/ft
3
too = freestream temperature, of
Voo = freestream velocity, fps
Heat transfer coefficients for idealized flat plate geometries (flat plate,
wedge, and cone) are fonnulated on the basis of applicable flow field param-
eters, and properties are evaluated at so-called "reference" conditions, as
noted earlier. For laminar flow, the Blasius solution of the boundary-layer
momentum equation and the modified Reynolds-analogy are used to obtain the
stanton number. The local heat transfer coefficient is then expressed as
-2 ~ P~Uf fS e'~' )O.ShL = 3.42 x 10 Pb~
2
where: ~ = laminar heat transfer coefficient, lb/hr-ft
Pf = local flow pressure lb/ft
2
Uf =
local flow velocity, fps
JI., = Reynolds number length, ft
p*~* = "Reference" density and viscosity
Pb~b = base value density and viscosity
For turbulent flow, the modified Reynolds-analogy relating the stanton
number to the skin-friction coefficient, and the Blasius local skin friction
coefficient are used to develop the heat transfer coefficient for use at
Reynolds numbers of less than 107 .
(p U )0.8( * *)0.8( *)-0.6f f P ~ ~
~0.2 Pb~b ~b
At Reynolds numbers beyond 107, the Von Karman local skin-frction coefficient
is used and results in
(p u )0.8691( * *)°.8691( )-0.7328
h
T
= 1.88 x 10-3 f f ~ ~*
~0.1309 Pb~ ~
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The determination of wedge and cone aerodynamic heating assumes a constant
Prandtl number of 0.65. An extended relationship of enthalpy to air tempera-
ture is incorporated into the program, taking into consideration the effects
of dissociation. The program utilizes the U. S. Standard Atmospheric
Properties.
Transition from laminar to turbulent flow was based on a local Reynolds
6Number of 10 . For these velocities, transition typically occurs between
250K to 300K feet (100 km) altitude.
Transient aerodYnamic heating was calculated for each trajectory at
four locations on the vehicle: 1) stagnation point; 2) cylinder at 110 em;
3) cylinder at 180 em; and 4) flare at 300 em. Results of these calculations
to a cold wall are shown in Fig. 6.15 for two extremes, the short high heat
pulse which occurs during a -900 reentry and the longer heat pulse occurring
during a _100 reentry . Table 6.10 gives the maximum heating rates and total
heating with the corresponding trajectory times (from 120 km altitUde) and
altitudes for each of the locations and trajectories of the reference design.
Variation of maximum heating with reentry angle is shown in Fig. 6.16.
6.3.2.2. Shock Layer Radiation. Another contribution to heating during
reentry is by radiation from the high temperature gas residing in the shock
layer. This is generally restricted to the stagnation region since the
magnitude falls off rapidly away from the stagnation point. It has been shown
that non-equilibrium radiative heating effects are small and equilibrium
radiative heating dominates (Fig. 6.17 from Ref. 29). In the velocity range
of 28 k fps to 38 k fps the formula is:
(
p )1.41( )20
8.16 x 10-
5 ~ P: :~-4
where, Poo and Voo are free stream density and velocity (fps) respectively
and ~ is the nose radius (ft).
This assumes an optically thin shock layer and shock layer thickness
of 0.045 RN for a hemispherical nose body. These are conservative assumptions
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since, at extreme reentry velocities, effects due to both energy loss by
radiation and self absorption may be significant and are not included. Thus,
the radiative heating becomes more severe for steep reentry angles with the
attendant high velocity at low altitudes.
Figure 6.15 shows a comparison of heating during reentry for the
Y = -900 and _100 trajectories. The peak radiati~e heating is about one-
third the cold-wall heat flux for the steep reentry. It is about 3% of the
cold wall peak heating for the shallow reentry. Other comparisons are shown
in Table 6.10 and Fig. 6.16.
6.3.2.3. Separated Flow Heating. Another region of increased heating on
the reentry vehicle is on the flare aft of the body juncture. It has been
demonstrated (Ref. 30) that boundary layer separation occurs on wedge angles
greater than 30 degrees. This condition is illustrated in.Fig. 6.18. The
flow reattaches at some point on the flare with a resulting local thinning
of the boundary layer and a corresponding increase in aerodYnamic heating.
Figure 6.19 shows the effect of separated flow on heating. This local
heating increases with both Mach number and Reynolds number, and can result
in heating factors of up to 3 times that of the unseparated flow.
Separated flow heating is difficult to predict since the reattachment
location is transient as a result of flow property dependence. This heating
affect was not included in the present study and needs to be defined
empirically for a specific configuration. The zone of increased heating
should be confined to a rather small region just aft of the body-flare
juncture. A localized increase in thermal protection will be necessary in
this region. The affect on total vehicle mass should be small.
6.3.3. Thermal Protection System
6.3.3.1. Heat Shield Selection. High reentry heating rates encountered
dictate a thermal protection system having minimum ablation yet having the
capability of insulating the underlying material. Graphite and carbon-
graphite composites afford excellent ablation characteristics.
l~
Fig. 6.18 '.
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Carbon/Graphite Fibrous Composites. A great deal of effort is being
expended in the development of carbon/graphite fibrous composites. This
work is being done to obtain higher strength graphitic material, and, hope-
fUlly, by the very nature of their construction, minimize catastrophic
failures as observed in the past for the bulk, polycrystalline graphites.
Table 6.11 summarizes the status and types of construction of several current,
carbon/graphite fibrous composites. A comparison of properties available
for several of these carbon/graphite composites and those ofAXF-5Q and
ATJ-S (bulk graphite materials) are presented in Table 6.12.
The overall properties of 2D laminates, such as Pyro-Carb 406 used on
the Graphite Lunar Module Fuel Capsule (GLFC), offer significant advantages
over the bulk graphites. Depending on direction, the tensile strength of
Pyro-Carb 406 is greater than the bulk graphites. A comparison of the
thermal expansion shows an advantage of the Pyro-Carb 406 over the bulk
graphites at room and slightly elevated temperatures. This advantage persists
at 2500-3000oK where the Pyro-Carb 406's thermal expansion is equivalent to
ATS-S and about half that ofAXF-5Q. Similarly, the thermal conductivity
of Pyro Carb 406 in the 1900-3000o K range is about half that of ATS-S and
about 20% lower than AXF-5Q.
Bulk Graphites. Bulk, polycrystalline graphites AXF-5Q and ATJ-S
were considered for this selection due to the availability of materials with
sufficient property data reported in the literature. AXF-5Q and ATJ-S are
bulk graphites which have been previously used in reentry shields.
Selection. From the comparison of the properties given in Table 6.12
(from Ref. 31), Pyro-Carb 406 was selected as the ablator due to its exten-
sive development for SNAP-27 and because it has a relatively low thermal
conductivity in the radial direction.
Zirconia felt was selected as the high temperature insulating material
underlying the Pyro-Carb heat shield. This is the same insulator used to
protect the LiH radiation shield/heat pipes from fire effects as discussed
in Section 6.1.
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TABLE 6,12
COMPARISON OF PROPERTIES OF CARBON/GRAPHITE FIBER COMPOSITES AND BULK GRAPHtTE
Mat i 1er a
. AVCO!Thornel 3D IProperty Relnforce'! Cra' hit.(6) Pvro-Cub 406(7) Super-T.ll\~ RPr!~) Poco AXF_~ri8) ATJ_S(S)
Den.ity (g ../«) 1.60 1.44 1.73 1.80 min. 1.80 a1n.
-Iene!lp. Strengtn- X-Y 15.0 - 19.0 Axial 12.5 X-y 5.0
- 7.0 7.0 With grain 3.3
~Qm Te'lllperature
Circumferential 5.0 Acro.. grein 3.2(10 3 pol) Z 7.5 - 10.0 - Z 1.8 - ~.S
Iladial 0.84
Strain to Fal1ure- 0.33 Circumferential 0.29 0.18 0.7 With grain 0.28
Room Temperature Across 8rain 0.48
006 poO
Tenone Modu1us- Ix-Y 4.6 - 4.9 Axial 2.75 X-Y 2.7 - 3.2 2.1 With grain 1.9
Rooa Temperature Across grain 1.3
(106 pst) Z 2.4 - 2.6 C1 rClJmferentlal 1. 75 Z 1.25- 1.42 ".
Iladial 0.84
-
Compress i ve X-Y 14.0 - 18.5 Axial 14 X-Y 11.5 - 12.5 19.6 Wi th grain 7.42
Strength- Across gratn 8.96
Room Tei:1perature Z (n/a) Ci rcumferentlal 7.5 Z 40.0
003 psi) Radial 17.1
Compressive X-Y 4.7
- 5.0 Axial 2.75 X-Y 1. 78 - 2.50 1. 75 WI th grain 1. 50
Modulus- Acro~s grain 1.00
Room Temperature Z 2.5 - 2.8 Cl rcumf erentlal 1.73 Z 2.00 - 2.85
(106 psi) Radial 0.56
Shear Strength- 3.2 2.3 1.5
-- --
Room T~n:pPTature
(103 ps l)
-_._-
-------_._- ._.
P01680n'9 ftat1o- "~r* 0.24 "xy 0.21Room Temperature
.39
uxy 0.10 lira 0.156 ~xz 0.20 "wv 0.12
u 0.10 0.1 0.19
"wa
0.06Ys "za "zx
Uzx uaz 0.064 0.140.08 l'a...
liar 0.2
l'rz 0.069
.- .-
Coeff lelent of 0.8 above 600'F
.
500' F Axial 60 CirciJm 0.23 X-Y 2.0 - 2.7 SOO·F 3.9 With Crain 1.5
Thel-u.al Expan~ion Radial 0.93 Across Crain 2. ~O.
(10-6In/in-'n l~OO·P Axial 60 CircUDl 0.75 1000'F 4.15 W!.th Crain 1. S5
Radial 1.72 Ac ro~s C:'a in 2.40
2000'F Axial 60 Circum 1.04 2000'F 4.6 With Grain 1.-30
Radial 2.18 Across Grain 2.50
3000'F Axial 60 Circum 1.64 3000'F 4.95 Wi th Cral n 2.00
Radial 2.63 Acr':>ss Grain l.7S
4000'F Axial 60 Circum 1.96 4000'F 5.2 With Crain 2.40'
Rodial 2.85 Across Crain 3.00
SOOO'F Axial 60 Clrcur.t 2.23 5000'F 5.3 WI th Crain 2 .~S
Radial 3.14 Across Grain ~.2S
6000·F Axial & Circum 2.36
R,!dia1 3.41
.
Thermol X-Y 65 Axial 9.68 X-Y 2.7 59.6 With Crain 8S.5
Conductivity A::.ross Crain 68.2
(Btu-ft/hr- Z 35 Ci rcumferent 1al 7.63 Z 6.1
tt 2_OF) Radial 4.97
Room Temperature
--_.
iOOO'F X-Y 38 Axial 11.16 X-Y 3.0 39.7 With Grain 50.1
Across Cratn 40.6
Z -- Ci rcumf eren t ial 8.24 Z 3.0
Radial 5.22
---
2000'F X-Y 22 Axial -- X-Y 5.4 25.0 With Crain 30.2
Across Crain 27.6
Z -- Circumferential 9.00 Z 2.5
Rodlal 5.58
3000'F x-\" 18 Axial -- X-Y 4.3 With C;r3ln 21.6
18.1 Across Crain 21.6
Z
--
Ci rcumferentlal 9.65 Z. 2.2
lsdh1 5.94
I,nOO'F Axial :~+ 13.8 "I th CraIn 19.0Across Crain 19.9Circun:f"el ent la1Radial_._-- -_. -5000'1' Axial 12.1 \;( th Grain 19.0Across Cratn 19.9CJ rcumferentiaJ
Radial -- j
------
i --_.
• o· Circ~fcrenti.l 106
r • hclal
z • Axial
6.3.3.2. structural Temperatures. A computer model of the thermal pro-
tection system at 4 locations on the vehicle was established using the
program of Ref. 32 to calculate transient structural temperatures during re-
entry from each of the abort trajectories. The model configurat ion is shown
in Fig. 6.20. structural support is provided by stainless steel.
Boundary conditions at the outboard surface were aerodynamic heating,
radiative heating (at the stagnation point) and radiation to the environment.
In all cases the inboard surfaces were considered to be adiabatic. A heat
load of 2.7 kW/ft2 introduced at the heat pipe zone was also included. Each
material layer is divided into segments, as shown in Fig. 6.20, for an ac-
curate conduction analysis. Temperatures are calculated for each vehicle
location based on an instantaneous, heat balance at the outboard surface,
while accounting for the radiative heat rejection at the surface and the in-
board conduction to underlying layers. The thermophysical properties of
specific heat and thermal conductivity were allowed to vary with local seg-
ment temperature. In addition, the thermal conductivity of the zirconia
felt was allowed to vary with ambient pressure. The computer program uti-
lizes the Crank-Nicholson numerical approximation to pure conduction, and a
modified form of this approximation in cases subject to boundary conditions.
This approach results in an implicit forward-backward time difference calcu-
lation of heat balance, through a matrix solution of a simultaneous equation
set.
Maximum reentry temperatures calculated for each vehicle location and
for each trajectory are given in Table 6.13. Comparative transient tempera-
tures are plotted in Fig. 6.21. The most severe heating of the stainless
steel structure generally occurs during orbital decay reentry for which the
long heat pulse allows significant inboard heat conduct ion. The highest
external temperatures occur during the steep reentry. Tumbling heating cor-
responding to Case 3, Section 6.3.1.1, for a separation failure case was not
calculated but should closely correspond to side wall temperatures for the
o
-90 reentry case.
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6.3.3.3. Graphite Ablation. The predominant mode of graphite ablation in
the 10000C to 25000C temperature regime is due to diffusion controlled oxi-
dation. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.22 (from Ref. 33). At lower tempera-
ture, ablation is reaction rate controlled while at higher temperatures
sublimation prevails, and depends upon local pressure.
Figure 6.23 shoWS the variation of the normalized mass loss as a
function of surface temperature and stagnation pressure. The normalizing
factor is the diffusion controlled oxidation mass transfer rate. Essentially,
the diffusion controlled osication regime is independent of surface tempera-
ture and can be put into the form
. R-IP 1/2~ -N e 6.2 x 10-3
where: diffusion controlled mass loss rate, lb/rt2-sec
nose radius, ft
stagnation pressure, lb/ft2
Transient mass loss rates were calculated from the ahove equation in
conjunction with Fig. 6.23. The results are shown in Fig. 6.24 for the
extremes of reentry at superorbital,velocities. Although a very high mass
loss rate is experienced during -90° reentry due to SUblimation, a greater
mass loss occurs during _10° reentry as a result of the substantially longer
heat pulse. Corresponding dimensional change of the Pyro-Carb 406 is 2.1 em
and 3.6 em, respectively.
6.4. TERMINAL VELOCITY IMPACT SYSTEMS
6.4.1. Aerodynamic Flare/Honeycomb
Parachutes were used during the initial studies for the RTPS for
drag augmentation to limit the earth impact terminal velocity to 26 m/sec.
Without parachutes the velocity would be 89 m/sec (292 fps) for the original
122-cm diameter flare. However, a significant reduction in terminal velo-
city can be realized by increasing the flare diameter. The impact velocity
is approximately proportional to the reciprocal of the flare diameter, while
111
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Fig. 6.22. Mass transfer regimes for ablating graphite
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Fig. 6.23. Normalized hypersonic ablation rate of graphite
over the entire range of surface temperature
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the mass of the flare varies as the square of the diameter. Consequently,
there is a practical limit to the site of the flare.
The effect of higher terminal velocities on the mass of a honeycomb
energy absorption system can be evaluated by determining the required
crushing strength using the formula:
where,
f
cr
WG
= A
W = mass of the impacting system,
G = design deceleration limit in gIs, and
A = impact area.
This stress must be corrected for possible variations in the impact angle
due to wind and gust effects, and by a safety factor to account for observed
decreases in strength with higher velocities. This correction will be
between 20 and 50%, depending on the wind velocity. Variations in honey-
comb length with terminal velocity are shown in Figure 6.25 and account for
the fact that only 70% of the total honeycomb thickness is available for
crushing. A suriunary of the various honeycomb characteristics for two
flare diameters is presented in Table 6.14. The specific energy of the system
is 20,000 joules/kg; which is comparable with frangible tubes (120,000
joules/kg) when taking int'o account that a minimum of 5 tubes are required
to provide the necessary angular distribution for a 20 mph wind condition.
The honeycomb mass for a 244 em flare is 25.1 kg, compared to 12.0 kg for
the reference design with'parachutes.
The influence of flare diameter and angle on mass is shown in Figure
6.26. Also shown is the resulting variation in honeycomb mass and the com-
bined masses for the 45° flare angle case. A minimum mass is obtained at a
flare diameter between 7 and 8 feet (244 em). Increasing the flare angle
to 60° will reduce the mass slightly and will lower the terminal velocity
approximately 9% (due to an increase in the subsonic drag coefficient) and
will reduce the required thickness of the honeycomb by 18%. The disadvantage
of increasing the flare angle is that the hypersonic drag coefficient will
114
10.0 _-----------------------------
8.0
6.0 200 g's deceleration
4.0
Fig. 6.25. Thickness of honeycomb energy absorption material with
sea level terminal velocity
115
TABLE 6.14
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HONEYCOMB ENERGY ABSORPTION
SYSTEM WITHOUT PARACHUTES
FLARE DIAMETER
Sea Level Terminal Velocity
Impact Stopping Distance for
200 g's Deceleration
Honeycomb Thickness
Honeycomb Crush Strength
Maximum Impact Angle
Loss of Crushing Strength
Honeycomb Density
Kinetic Energy
Energy Absorbing Capacity
Specific Energy of Honeycomb
Honeycomb Mass
Aerodynamic Flare Mass
Total Impact Protection Mass
116
122 cm
(4 ft)
89 m/sec
(292 fps)
202 em
(6.62 ft)
288 cm
(9.45 ft)
441 n/cm2
(640 psi)
5.70
22 %
148 kg/m3
(9.2 1b/ft3)
61. 8( 10) 6Joules
(1.3xlO ft-1b)
9(10)6 J/m2
(6xl05ft-1b/ft2)
2(10)4 J/kg
(7xl03ft-1b/1b)
84.5 kg
7.8 kg
92.3 kg
244 em
(8 ft)
45 m/sec
(147 fps)
51.4 em
(1.68 ft)
73.4 em
(2.41 ft)
469 n/em2
(680 psi)
11.30
33 %
172 kg/m2
(10.7 1b/ft3)
4.8(10) §JOuleS
(3.5xlO ft-1b)
2.4(10)6 J/m2
(1.6xl05ft-1b/ft2)
1.9(10)4 J/kg
(6.3xl03ft-1b/1b)
25.1 kg
35.7 kg
60.8 kg
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increase due to aerodynamic effects and the heating will rise, with a pos-
sible requirement for additional graphite insulation.
Due to wind and gust effects the safety system may have a velocity
component parallel to the surface of the earth at the time of impact. If
the terminal velocity is comparable with the wind velocity, the angular
dispacement may be significant enough to reduce the energy absorption capa-
bilities of the honeycomb. Furthermore, a high angular velocity could im-
pose excessive "g" loads on the radiator heat pipes. However, analysis has
shown that due to the short time duration of the impact event (23 milliseconds
at 45 m/sec), the angular rotation will be only 1°, which will not affect the
honeycomb crushing characteristics. Additionally, the maximum predicted
sidewise "g" load on the auxiliary radiator will be only 16 gIs, which is
small relative to the 200 g vertical impact load.
6.4.2. Alternate Energy Absorption Systems
The two energy absorption concepts considered for the safety system
have been honeycomb structures and frangible tubes. The frangible tube con-
cept affords a means to achieve the maximum specific energy (joules/kg) of
metals, where Maraging steel has one of the highest energy absorption
potentials (260,000 j/kg theoretical maximum), which is about twice that of
aluminum alloys. However, frangible tubes have the primary disadvantages of
unpredictable load levels (Ref. 33) and poor angular capabilities (Ref. 34).
other passive energy absorption schemes, such as collapsible metal tubes and
hydraulic cylinders (Ref. 33), have poor efficiency, cause severe load
fluctuations and are generally less desirable than honeycomb. Active or
cyclic devices, such as retrorockets and cyclic strain devices, have inherent
reliability problems associated with controls and orientation.
Frangible tube system mass tradeoff calculations were performed to
determine the potential of this design concept to replace the original honey-
comb and parachute reentry safety equipment. Table 6.15 tabulates des ign
characteristics of a potential frangible tube energy absorption system.
Although the weight is comparable to the honeycomb/flare combination, it was
n8
TABLE 6.15
FRANGIBLE TUBE DESIGN WITHOUT PARACHUTES
Input Velocity
Design Deceleration/Mass
Assumed Cross Wind Velocity
Tube Diameter
Wall Thickness
Stroke Length
Mass of Tube
Mass of 4 Dies
Frangible Tube System Mass
119
89 m/sec (292 fps)
200 g I s /400 kg
9 m/s (20 mph)
6.31 cm
0.34 cm
202 cm
10.4 kg
3.7 kg
70 kg
rejected because of its long length, developmental status, and overall
design uncertainty. Honeycomb energy absorption systems, on the other hand,
are well developed and can be fabricated in a large variety of configurations
with a wide range of energy absorption capacity. In addition, honeycomb
systems can be improved by loading the cells with rigidizing foam, which
increases the energy absorption and crush strength, and improves the load
response characteristics. Lastly, considerable aerospace experience has
been obtained on honeycomb systems which were used on the Surveyor and the
Apollo Command Module and LEM vehicles (Ref. 33).
The land impact reqUirement for the RTPS is similar in some respects
to that of a mobile nuclear reactor. Recent work on reactor impact protection
systems has been discussed with NASA Lewis personnel (Refs. 35 and 36). Their
approach has been to abandon energy absorption schemes in favor of surrounding
the reactor with a containment vessel. The vessel and its contents then
absorb the entire impact energy without rupturing the containment vessel.
Reentry terminal velocities of the RTPS are sufficiently low so that
energy absorption systems can be designed and a 4n direct-impact system is
not required. Another advantage of the RTPS system is that the impact atti-
tude can be assured with the aerodYnamic flare stabilizer. Based on the
various energy absorption schemes investigated, the crushable honeycomb
appears to be the most acceptable approach considering design confidence,
load characteristics and specific energy.
6.4.3. Earth Impact Burial
6.4.3.1. System Burial. Earth penetration models developed by Young (Ref. 37)
of Sandia Labs were used to determine if impact velocities were sufficient to
cause burial. The empirical relationship developed by Young, based on approxi-
mately 200 full-scale penetration tests, is given by the following e~uation:
v < 200 feet per second
120
D = depth of penetration, measured along the penetration path, feet
V = impact velocity, fps
S = soil constant, depends on specific soil conditions
N = constant, vehicle nose performance coefficient (taken as 0.82 for a
spherical nose
W = total vehicle mass, pounds
A = cross-sectional, or frontal area, square inch.
Table 6.16 summarizes computed burial depths for different flare designs and
for three different types of soils. For an 8-foot (244 cIIi) diameter flare with
a 45° angle, the maximrun penetration depth is only 0.57 meters. By comparison,
the distance from the vehicle nose to the active portion of the auxiliary
radiator is approximately 1 meter. Consequently, unless the system impacts
into a moist or highly plastic SOil, earth penetration depth will not cause
burial.
6.4.3.2. Heat Source Temperatures. In the unlikely event that the heat
source is broken upon impact with the earth and a capsule is lying upon the
ground, it will lose heat through radiation to its surroundings, air con-
vection over the capsule and conduction to the earth. If one-half of the
capsule surface is considered to dissipate the 325 watts of isotopic heat,
then the capsule surface temperature will be 1060oK, assuming turbulent
natural convection and a surface emittance of 0.8. If the capsule becomes
completely buried in the earth, then the heat must be dissipated into the
earth and from the earth to the atmosphere. For dry sandy loam with k
.00934 W/cm OK arid a burial depth of 30 cm, the 6T between the earth I s sur-
face and the capsule is 836°K. Assuming the heat leaves the earth-over a
0.09 m2 plane, the 6T between the earth and air is 200o K. Therefore the
predicted capsule temperature in case of burial is 1350o K, which is consider-
ably below the melting point of W-Re and in a range where capsule integrity
would be maintained for several hours (typical recovery times) prior to air
oxidation.
6.4.3.3. Auxiliary Radiator Temperatures. Figure 6.27 shows temperature
tradeoffs of the RTPS with diameter of the safety radiator for the case of no
121
TABLE 6.l6
COMPUTED BURIAL DEPTH FOR TERMTIrAL VELOCITY
IMPACT OF THE RTPS ONTO VARIOUS SOILS
t
Burial Depth for Different Soil Types
RTPS Rock Highly Sand, Silty,
Flare Terminal Welded, Fine Clayey, Dense Sand,
Design Velocity Grained Agglomerate (Desert Alluvium) Loose, Mois
(S = 1.07) (S = 4.4) (s = 6.5)
* * *4 ft flare 89 nIps .25 m 1.10 m 1.49 m
(292 fps) (.81 ft) (3.32 ft) (4.91 ft)
6 ft flare 59 nIpS .14 .58 .86
(193 fps) (.46) (1.90) (~.81)
8 ft flare 45 nIpS .09 .38 .57
(450 ) (147 fps ( .31) (1.26) (1.86)
8 ft flare 41 mps .08
·32 .48(600 ) (134 fps) ( .26) (1.06) (1. 57)
*These values are increased by 13% when the high velocity relationships
are applied.
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,burial and partial burial. The results show that temperatures for the burial
case will cause melting of the LiH, but should not exceed the 12000 K heat
pipe limit.
6.4.4.. Effect of Impact on Fuel Form
As described in Section 6.4.1., the crushable honeycomb struc-
ture in the nose of the safety equipment limits the rate of deceleration
of the radioisotope heat source to 200 GIS (19,600 m/sec2 ). The effect of
this deceleration on the fuel form is to produce a compressive stress.
If the restraining effect of the cladding is ignored, the stress in the fuel
varies linearly from zero at the end of the capsule nearest the aerodynamic
flare to a maximum at the end nearest the nose. This maximum is
(J
ma
-- =A
0.160 (19600)
where m the mass of fuel (kg),
2
a the rate of deceleration (m/sec ), and
2A the cross-sectional area of fuel (m ).
A compressive stress of 5 x 106 N/m2 (700 psi), should have no effect
on a ceramic material like Gm203• Thus the fuel is expected to survive
impact on land with the fuel form completely intact.
6.5 RADIATION SHIELDING TRADEOFFS
Various shielding studies were performed during the first phase of the
RTPS study (Ref. 1 ). Additional evaluations were required, however, to
evaluate system considerations on lowering accident radiation levels from
the 244Cm fuel. Results of LiH shielding scaling calculations indicate that
the overall sys~em diameter increases 10 em for 200 kg increase in shield
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mass. This mass is nearly twice that of the shield alone, with the balance
allowing for mass increases in the structure and other major components.
The effect of additional LiH shielding around the heat source on neutron
dose rate is shown in Fig. 6.28 as a function of added safety system mass
and system outside diameter. Dose at distances of one, three and ten meters
were considered, and correspond approximately to: (1) surface conditions,
(2) the closest reasonable distance for short-term exposure, and (3) a rep-
resentative distance for the immediate surrounding area which could be used
as an estimate for longer term exposure.
There are no specific guidelines which can be applied to the allowable
radiation dose from the accidental land impact of the heat source. A level
of 1 r/hr at 1 meter from the surface is the maximum allowable dose due to
damage resulting from an isotope fuel cask drop test (Ref. 38). Another ap-
plicable limit is the 25 r whole body dose which is used for reactor siting
studies (10 CFR-IOO). This also is the maximum accident or emergency exposure
for once in a lifetime occurrence (NBS Handbooks 49,69, and 92). Applying
the 1 r/hr limit at one meter from the surface would require that approxi-
mately 20 cm of LiH be added to the reference design thickness of' 10 cm.
This thickness corresponds to a 400 kg increase in safety system mass. At a
distance of 3 meters, a 200 kg increase would be sufficient to limit the dose
rate to 1 r /hr or a 24 rem exposure in 1 day. At the 10 meter distance, only
70 kg of additional mass is required to limit the whole body dose to 25 rem
in one week. These mass increases must be compared to the masses of other
types of safety equipment, such as electronic beacons to enhance recovery
capabilities and improved structures to resist impact damage. Considering
these factors, in addition to recovery practices employed for other aero-
space programs, it was determined that recovery times of 6 to 12 hours on
land, with tracking data, could be expected. Consequently, at a 3 meter dis-
tance, the maximum possible accidental dose between impact and recovery would
be less than 25 mr; and no added LiH shielding is required.
As the thickness of LiH shielding is increased, the cylindrical portion
of the safety system radiator increases and the reentry characteristics of
the system vary. Figure 6.28 shows preliminary estimates of the effect of
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added safety system shielding mass and diameter on sea level terminal velo-
city of the heat source without aerodynamic retardation devices. The com-
puted subsonic ballistic coefficient for the reference design was 101 1b/ft2
(490 kg/m2) which corresponds to a sea level terminal velocity of 89 m/sec,
or 104 m/sec at a 10,000 ft altitude. The terminal velocity was computed
with the following relation:
where:
VT = terminal velocity,
~I = subsonic ballistic coefficient (weight/drag coefficient x projected
area)
P = density of air at a specified altitude.
The curves in Fig. 6.~9 show that the terminal velocity will increase rapidly
with auditional safety system shielding unless the flare diameter is also
increased. Table 6.~7 compares pertinent design information for the reference
design and one that includes an added 200 kg mass--due either to LiH, insula-
tion, graphite addition or other system change. For comparison, values are
shown for flare diameters from 122 to 244 em.
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TABLE 6.17
SUMMARY OF DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS FOR 200 kg INCREASE
IN SAFETY SYSTEM MASS CASE
Reference
Design
1. Radiation Dose (r/hr)
200 kg Mass
Increase
•
•
1 Meter from Heat Source
3 Meters from Heat Source
15.6
2.8
5.2
0.92
2. Post Land Impact Temperatures (OK)
• Radiation Heat Transfer
• Radiation Plus Convection
• System Half Buried
3. Geometry (cm)
• Diameter of Safety System
• Thickness of LiH Shield
4. Drag Coefficient
• Hypersonic
• Subsonic
5. Ballistic Coefficient (kg/m2)
• HYpersonic - Fixed Flare
- Increased Flare*
• Subsonic - Fixed Flare
- Increased Flare*
6. Terminal Velocity (Sea Level) m/sec
• Fixed Flare Diameter (122 em)
• Increased Flare Diameter
• 8' Diameter Flare (244 em)
7. Stagnation Heating Coefficient (Nose)
(Heating relative to reference design)
• Fixed Flare Diameter (4 ft, 122 em)
• Increased Flare Diameter
• 8' Diameter Flare (244 em)
900
865
1035
50.3
10
1.16
0.77
329.4
(67.4 psr)
329.4
(67.4 psf)
495.5
(101.4 psf)
495.5
(101.4 psf)
89.0
(292 fps)
89.0
(292 fps)
43.3
(142 fps)
1.0
1.0
0.50
820
790
950
70.3
20
1.13
0.71
490.1
(100.3 psf)
243.9
(49.9 psf)
776.5(158.9 psf)
366.5
(75.0 psf)
111.6
(366 fps)
76.8
(252 fps)
52.4
(172 fps)
1.03
0.73
0.50
*Flare diameter increased directly with safety system diameter (170.6 em for
200 kg case).
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7. LIFETIME LIMITING MECHANISM
The potential for achieving the 36,000 hour lifetime, required for a
class of missions was examined. The Cm203 capsule (at 2030
0 K surface tem-
perature) and emitter heat pipes (at 19000 K) are expected to be the limiting
components. Of principal concern is the effect of free oxygen released from
Cm203 on the isotope capsules and the emitter heat pipes.
7.1. EFFECT OF OXYGEN ON THE FUEL CAPSULES
The oxygen pressure over Cm203 at 2073°K (1800
0 c) is estimated to be
of the order of 10-5_10-6 torr (Ref.39). The exact oxygen pressure will
depend on the impurities present and their concentration. Further, the vapor
species in the vaporization reaction of Cm203 have not been definitely
characterized.
At 5 x 10-6 torr oxygen pressure and 2073°K (18000 c) a sublimation
rate of 7 x 10-3 mg/cm2 hr of tungsten from the tungsten -26% rhenium alloy
is possible (Ref. 4~. This is equivalent to an effective removal rate of
5 x 10-9 m/hr. In 36,000 hours the potential sublimation loss would be'
0.2 mm. This reaction rate is essentially linear with oxygen pressure. Thus
the removal rate would be reduced to 0.02 mm per 36,000 hours at an oxygen
pressure of 5 x 10-7 torr.
The effect of this sublimation removal of tungsten would be to leave
a porous surface layer rich in rhenium. However, in a 10,000 hour life test
of Cm203
2123°K (18500 C) encapsulated in w-26% Re, no such porous layer has
been observed (Ref. 41). This may have been due to the sealed condition of
the capsule which prevents loss of tungsten oxide vapors. Another possibility
is that the oxygen pressure over Cm203
is suppressed by the presence of
1]0
impurities such as the PU203
formed by radioactive decay of C:m203
' It would
appear that oxygen pressure over the fuel is quite important to the lifetime
of the fuel capsule, and, as discussed below, to the lifetime of the emitter
heat pipes. Better definition of the vaporization species at temperature is
recommended.
Should oxygen induced sublimation of W-26% Re alloy prove to be a
problem, remedies may be found. One of these is to coat the surfaces with
a layer of rhenium metal. Rhenium sublimation under these conditions is
lower than that of tungsten by an order of magnitude.
7 .2. EFFECT OF OXYGEN ON THE: EMITTER HEAT PIPES
The emitter heat pipes will be exposed to oxygen diffusing through
the walls of the capsule and leaking through the helium vent plug. Effects
of the oxygen on the tungsten walls of the heat pipes and on the lithium
working fluid are both considered.
The permeation coefficient of oxygen though tungsten at 20300 K is
32 1 60.7 em (stp)-mm/em hr atm2 (Ref.42). If the oxygen pressure is 5 x 10-
torr within the C:m203
capsules and the pressure outside the capsules is much
lower, the permeation rate of oxygen through the 0.5 nun-thick walls of each
capsule is 0.01 em3( stp) /hr. The leakage of oxygen through a porous plug
helium vent designed to build up a helium back pressure of the order of one
atmosphere is negligible by comparison. If the rate of oxygen loss were con-
stant over the 36,000 hour lifetime of the system, the total amount of oxygen
released from 136 capsules would be 70 g or 0.5 g per capsule. The rate of
oxygen loss should, in fact, decrease as the oxygen pressure over the fuel is
reduced by depletion of oxygen and buildup of PU203
(0.5 g is slightly over
4% of the initial oxygen loading in the capsule, and 15% of the Cm203
will
be converted to PU203
after 36,000 hours).
The pressure of oxygen in the heat source will depend on how well the
oxygen diffusing through the capsule walls is vented to space. At the initial
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release rate of 0.01 cm3/b:r per capsule, a vent area amounting to 10 cm2 is
-6
necessary to reduce the oxygen pressure in the heat source to 10 torr. An
oxygen vent of this size would allow about 800 watts, or 2% of the total heat
to be radiated to space from the heat source. A more effective method of
lowering the oxygen pressure would be to provide an oxygen getter such as
tantalum within the heat source.
-6If the oxygen pressure in the heat source is 10 torr, the rate of
sublimation removal of tungsten from the emitter heat pipe walls would be
2 x 10-9 m/b:r or 70 m in 36,000 hours. At 10-6 torr, oxygen permeation of
each emitter heat pipe will be 0.0015 cm3(stp)/b:r or 70 mg in 36,000 hours.
Oxygen entering the heat pipe will be gettered by the lithium working fluid
at the rate of about 1 mg of lithium per mg of oxygen. This will make some
of the lithium unavailable as a working fluid and require an initial excess.
Clogging of the wick with oxides will probably not be serious at the 70 mg
level but must be evaluated experimentally.
7.3 • TEST PROGRAM TO DETERMINE OXYGEN EFFECTS
A test program is defined here to evaluate the potential effects of
oxygen released from the Cm203 fuel. A parametric test program is recommended
to provide data to the system designer. Such data will permit the designer
to minimize the effects of oxygen by choice of design and operating condi-
tions. The two questions that must be answered are: How much oxygen is .
released; and how does oxygen affect the capsules and emitter heat pipes.
The oxygen release from Cm203 capsules should be measured by fabri-
cating large, thin-walled capsules of W-26% Re alloy, loading them with
purified 244Cm203 and welding them shut. The capsules should be sized with
adequate void volume for helium accumulation to permit life tests for 10,000
hours. Each capsule should be tested in a vacuum chamber equipped with a
residual gas analyzer to measure the oxygen release rate. Care must be taken
to eliminate other sources of oxygen or oxygen gettering materials which
could prevent the oxygen release rate from being determined accurately.
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Capsule test temperatures of 1900, 2000, and 2l00o K would cover the range of
interest. Tests of this type could best be performed at a facility with hot
cells designed for high level alpha activity, such as Oak Ridge National
Laboratory.
The effect of oxygen on the emitter heat pipes should be determined
by fabricating heat pipes similar to those in the reference design and
operating them at similar heat fluxes in vacuum chambers with controlled
oxygen pressure. Here again, long-term testing of 10,000 hour or greater
-5 -2duration is recommended. A range in oxygen pressure from 10 to 10 torr
and a range in heat pipe temperature from l800-2000oK are recommended.
Tests of this tyPe could best be performed at a laboratory with extensive
experience in high vacuum technology and long-term life testing at thermionic
temperatures, such as Gulf General Atomic.
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8. COST ESTIMATES
The principal cost elements of the radioisotope thermionic power supply
are the em2l.J4 fuel and its encapsulation (Ref. 1). The cost of the safety
equipment is relatively low, so that the modifications made in this equip-
ment do not have a significant effect on the cost of the power source. The
only significant change in cost is a result of the reduction in mission
duration from 72,000 hours (Ref. 1) to the present 36,000 hours. The reduc-
tion in time for radiosiotope decay reduces the initial fuel loading (for
the same loading at end-of-:-mission) from 51.75 kW to l.J4.2 kW. The cost of
the fuel is reduced from $5,175,000 to $4,420,000, a saving of $755,000.
A revised estimate for the recurring costs of the power source is given in
Table 8.1.
TABLE 8.1
FLIGHT SYSTEM COSTS
unit Cost Item Cost (103 $)
C . 244 F 1urlUffi ue
Encapsulation costs
Emitter heat pipes
Thermionic converters
Radiator heat pipes
Power conditioning
Beryllium shield
Heat source case & insulation
Safety System
Auxiliary heat pipes
Fire shield
LiH shielding
Reentry heat shield
Structure
Assembly operations
Launch support equipment
Auxiliary prelaunch shielding
$ 100/thermal watt
$ 15,000/capsule
$ 5,000
$ 5,000
$ 2,000
$ 2,000/module
$ 700/ 1b
$ 750
TOTAL
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4,420
2,040
20
300
30
50
60
40
200
100
30
8,172
9 • CONCLUDING SECTION
This study showed the feasibility of a passive containment system for
the 244Cm isotope. The passive containment system has inherent reliability
and safety advantages over the original design (Ref. 1), in which mechanical
systems were required to operate in certain launch abort conditions. In
the present design, the launch escape rocket system is replaced by a blast
shield and a fire shield. The blast shield protects against a booster
explosion on the launch pad or during ascent to earth escape. The fire
shield, which consists of refractory thermal insulation (zirconia felt) and
a heat storage material (lithium hydride), protects the isotopic fuel and
its containment vessel from a sustained propellant fire on the launch pad.
The aerodYnamic flare, which stabilizes the orientation during reentry from
an abort trajectory, was enlarged to reduce the ballistic coefficient and
the terminal velocity. At the lower velocity, the impact energy is ab-
sorbed by a crushable honeycomb structure in the nose of the reentry body,
with no parachutes required to reduce the velocit,y.
The design changes, incorporating a passive containment system and
eliminating the need for a launch escape rocket and parachutes, resulted in
an increase in the mass of the safety equipment. The mass of the safety
equipment, which is discarded once Earth escape has been verified, was in-
creased by 270 kg to 575 kg. Since the safety equipment is jettisoned
early in the heliocentric portion of the mission, its mass has a relatively
small effect on mission performance. The reduction in payload mass due to
the 270 kg increase in the safety equipment is only about 55 kg for a typical
mission, such as an orbiter of Saturn.
Calculations of the effects of oxygen released from the Cm203 fuel
showed that oxygen-induced sublimation of the capsule and emitter heat pipe
or oxygen contamination of the lithium working fluid in the heat pipe could
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limit the lifetime of the system. More experimental data on o:xygen release
rates and effects of o:xygen are required before radioisotope power systems
of this type can be designed with reasonable assurance of meeting a specified
lifetime objective. It appears that lowering the temperature of the iso-
topic fuel and using o:xygen getters in the heat source will both be effec-
tive in reducing o:xygen effects on the heat source.
The next step in the development of the radioisotope thermionic power
supply for electric propulsion applications should be to establish the mat-
erials and fabrication technology for the isotope capsule and emitter heat
pipe. Capsule vents must be developed to release helium but minimize the
loss of fuel and resist plugging by condensed fuel vapors. The bulk of this
development can be performed using a non-radioactive fuel simulant. A few
confirmatory tests should be performed with 244Cm203-fueled capsules. Fabri-
cation methods for emitter heat pipes should be developed and heat pipes
tested over a range in temperature, heat flux, and o:xygen pressure so that
the results can be extrapolated to the long lifetimes required for electric
propulsion missions.
In addition to establishing the feasibility of a 36,oOO-hour lifetime,
the technology development efforts will determine the maximum thermionic
emitter temperature and, hence, the maximum performance level for the power
system. Coupled with the technology development effort to establish per-
formance levels should be a more thorough and detailed planning effort for
the total development program through the first flight. A detailed program
plan will permit a more accurate estimate to be made of the development
schedule and cost of the system. The decision whether to develop the system
would then be made on the basis of' more accurate mission performance, schedule,
and cost data.
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